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THE CONTINGENT FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer* 
In the past forty years, the U.S. Supreme Court has increasingly advanced 
the notion that the Fourth Amendment encompasses the common-law 
restrictions on searches and seizures that existed in 1791 when the Amendment 
was adopted. Yet, in case after case, the Court has encountered indeterminacy 
in the common law circa 1791. At times, the Court confronts this 
indeterminacy by concluding that, in the absence of a clear common-law rule, 
the Fourth Amendment does not govern the issue. At other times, in the face of 
indeterminacy, the Court falls back upon general Fourth Amendment 
principles. And on occasion the Court pretends that the indeterminacy does not 
exist. 
The reason for the absence of clear common-law search-and-seizure rules 
in 1791 is that the common law differed in important respects among the new 
American States. More importantly, the Anti-Federalists, those who demanded 
that the Bill of Rights be added to the Constitution as the price of ratification, 
recognized that the common law differed by State. This differentiated common 
law included the common-law rights of Englishmen secured by state 
constitutions and bills of rights. The Anti-Federalists saw the common law not 
as a fixed set of rules they were freezing in time, but as fluid, contingent, and 
evolving around them. Thus, if the Court is going to continue to interpret the 
Fourth Amendment as incorporating common-law search-and-seizure rules, it 
must come to terms with the fact that the common law of 1791 was viewed by a 
significant part of the population as contingent rather than fixed. And given 
that we owe the Bill of Rights to the Anti-Federalists, it makes some sense to 
interpret its commands in light of their view of the common law. 
This Article introduces a view of the Fourth Amendment—the contingent 
Fourth Amendment—that courts and commentators have overlooked. It asserts 
that we ought to conceive of our rights against unreasonable searches and 
seizures by federal officials as being largely contingent on state law. The only 
 
 * Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University. My heartfelt 
thanks to Tom Davies, Don Dripps, Mike Favale, David Gray, Renée Hutchins, Orin Kerr, Kit Kinports, Larry 
Rosenthal, Ric Simmons, Laurent Sacharoff, David Sklansky, George Thomas, Jonathan Witmer-Rich, and 
participants at the 2012 Conference of the Southeastern Law Schools Association for their helpful comments 
on various iterations of this Article. © 2015 Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer. 
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common-law rules that the Fourth Amendment freezes into the Constitution are 
those explicitly set forth in the Warrant Clause: rules against warrants that are 
general, issued on less than probable cause, or unsupported by oath or 
affirmation. The residuum of constitutional search-and-seizure rules are to be 
dictated by state law, even when it is a federal officer doing the searching or 
seizing. On this approach, as a matter of federal constitutional law, a federal 
officer is generally constrained by the search-and-seizure law of the State 
where a federal search or seizure occurs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There have always been two competing views of the common law in this 
country. One view posits the common law as relatively stable across time and 
uniform across borders. The second view conceives of the common law as 
fluid and differentiated, evolving to meet the needs of a growing society and 
adapting to meet the needs of different polities. Since the rise of legal realism 
in the early twentieth century, the latter view has generally won out. But its 
victory is incomplete because the view of the common law as a discoverable, 
unchanging monolith has prevailed in one significant respect: it is the view that 
typically drives originalist approaches to the Constitution.1 
The prevailing view of the Fourth Amendment2 is a prime example. Over 
the past forty years, the U.S. Supreme Court has increasingly advanced the 
notion that the Fourth Amendment tracks the common law of search and 
seizure as it existed in 1791 when the Amendment was adopted. In other areas, 
the Court has embraced the Realist view that the common law is nothing more 
 
 1 See Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 553–54 (2006) 
(“Originalists’ invocations of the common law posit a fixed, stable, and unified eighteenth-century 
content . . . .”); David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 
1795 (2000) (observing that originalists tend to “treat the common law as a unified, systematic body of rules, 
constant across space and time”). 
 2 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.”). 
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or less than the positive law of each individual jurisdiction, adapted and refined 
for reasons of public policy distinctive to that jurisdiction.3 Yet the Court 
typically acts as if the common law of search and seizure as of 1791 was 
generally a unified corpus of settled doctrine. 
As it turns out, there rarely was consensus in the common law of 1791 on 
the issues that matter to lawyers. Examination of the law of search and seizure 
during the founding period, as expressed in the justice of the peace manuals 
used by magistrates and constables, demonstrates important differences across 
borders and over time. These differences concerned such significant matters as 
the appropriate grounds for a warrantless arrest, whether one could search 
incident to arrest, whether and under what circumstances doors could be 
broken to make an arrest, and when, if ever, nocturnal searches were justified. 
Indeed, at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted, the States differed on 
such a fundamental matter as whether a warrant was necessary to search 
non-dwelling premises. 
Importantly, a significant portion of framers and ratifiers of the Bill of 
Rights understood that the common law in general, and the law of search and 
seizure in particular, was thus differentiated. In particular, the Anti-Federalist 
opponents of the Constitution embraced this proto-Realist, jurisdiction-specific 
view of the law. Their speeches and essays in opposition to the Constitution 
suggest that they sought not constraints on federal search-and-seizure authority 
that would be uniform across the Nation but rather conformity of federal actors 
with the laws of the respective States. Ultimately, a sufficient number of 
moderate Anti-Federalists dropped their opposition to the Constitution in 
return for the promise of a Bill of Rights that would provide such constraints. 
Because we owe the Bill of Rights and, indeed, the Nation we know today to 
these moderate Anti-Federalists, we should give their views primacy when 
interpreting the Fourth Amendment. 
Consistent with this view, this Article argues that, at least from an 
originalist standpoint, the Fourth Amendment is best viewed as being largely 
contingent on state law. That is to say, if the Court is to continue to attempt to 
ascribe to the Fourth Amendment the meaning it was understood to have in 
1791, the Amendment is best viewed as having incorporated state law 
search-and-seizure constraints against federal actors, so that federal agents and 
 
 3 See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004) (“[W]e now tend to understand common 
law not as a discoverable reflection of universal reason but, in a positivistic way, as a product of human 
choice.”). 
MANNHEIMER PROOFS2 5/7/2015  10:43 AM 
2015] THE CONTINGENT FOURTH AMENDMENT 1233 
officers are bound by the search-and-seizure rules in the respective States in 
which they operate.4 The only exceptions are the rules set forth explicitly in the 
Warrant Clause: bars on general warrants5 and those not issued upon probable 
cause or unsupported by oath or affirmation. By its terms the Amendment fixes 
these as uniform throughout the Nation. But the rest were likely understood, by 
a significant number of the framers and ratifiers of the Bill of Rights, as being 
contingent on state law. 
Part I of this Article discusses the Supreme Court’s reliance on common 
law to decide Fourth Amendment cases. It shows that the Court often pretends 
that the common law of 1791 was settled and uniform when it was neither. On 
other occasions, the Court confronts the vagueness of the common law of 1791 
but does not follow a uniform approach when the common law was hazy. 
Part II sifts through the justice of the peace manuals used from 1761 to 1795, 
which are the best evidence we have of search-and-seizure doctrine and 
practice across North America. This examination shows that the common law 
of search and seizure, while generally consistent over time and across borders, 
also encompassed several significant differences in different jurisdictions 
during different times. This Part also demonstrates that statutory authority to 
search premises differed by State in the decade before ratification of the Fourth 
Amendment. Part III demonstrates that those who demanded the Bill of Rights, 
the Anti-Federalists, understood that the common law varied by State. It also 
shows that the Anti-Federalists demanded a bill of rights because they viewed 
the States as the primary guardians of liberty and feared that the centralizing 
tendencies of the Constitution would allow the federal government to bypass 
state protections of rights. In this way, they understood individual rights as 
being calibrated to state norms. Viewed in this light, the Anti-Federalists’ 
 
 4 This is a very different sort of contingency than that addressed by Wayne A. Logan, Contingent 
Constitutionalism: State and Local Criminal Laws and the Applicability of Federal Constitutional Rights, 
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 143 (2009). Professor Logan observes that the Fourth Amendment standards of 
reasonable suspicion and probable cause operate differently in different States because of differences in 
underlying substantive criminal law. Because of these differences, probable cause or reasonable suspicion to 
believe a crime has occurred or is about to occur might exist in one State although the same conduct would not 
give rise to probable cause or reasonable suspicion in another State. See id. at 151–56. This Article asserts that 
the standards themselves that are applicable to federal officers, and not just how those standards are applied, 
should be thought to differ by State. 
  The central thesis of this Article shares some similarities with that of Note, The Fourth Amendment’s 
Third Way, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1627 (2007), which also argues that Fourth Amendment reasonableness 
analysis should use state law as its touchstone. Although that Note is highly persuasive and well written, it 
does not address the Fourth Amendment from an originalist standpoint. 
 5 General warrants are those “that lack[] specificity as to whom to arrest or where to search.” Thomas Y. 
Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 558 n.12 (1999). 
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demands for restrictions on federal search-and-seizure authority can be 
reinterpreted largely as demands that the power of federal agents be 
subordinated to state search-and-seizure constraints. This Part contends that the 
Anti-Federalist perspective should be given primacy in any originalist reading 
of the Bill of Rights because the Bill was the price exacted by the moderate 
Anti-Federalists in exchange for their reluctant support for the Constitution. 
Finally, Part IV discusses some of the promises and perils of reinterpreting the 
Fourth Amendment as subjecting federal agents to state search-and-seizure 
rules.6 
I. USE AND MISUSE OF THE COMMON LAW IN FOURTH AMENDMENT CASES 
The Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause is very specific. It sets out three 
requirements—particularity, oath or affirmation, and probable cause—before a 
warrant may be issued. By contrast, the Amendment’s Reasonableness Clause 
is “vague [and] unilluminating.”7 It provides a benchmark of reasonableness 
for all those search-and-seizure questions not answered by the Warrant Clause, 
which is to say, most of them: When are warrants required? How must they be 
executed? Under what circumstances can warrantless searches and seizures be 
made? And so on. In the past forty years, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
increasingly relied on the common law as it existed in 1791 to determine the 
meaning of the Reasonableness Clause. But in relying on the common law of 
1791, the Court all too often either has downplayed the extent to which the 
common law of 1791 was unclear or nonuniform, or else has failed to come to 
grips with the consequences of that lack of clarity and uniformity. 
 
 6 This Article does not attempt to address the important question of whether and to what extent the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Fourth. While the Article does look to cases applying the Fourth 
Amendment to the States in analyzing current Fourth Amendment doctrine, that is the unavoidable 
consequence of the Court’s having treated the Amendment identically when applied to the States as it is 
applied to the federal government. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964) (“We have held that . . . the 
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures of the Fourth Amendment . . . are . . . to be enforced against 
the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that protect those personal rights 
against federal encroachment.”). If the Fourth Amendment is at least in part a federalism-based constraint, then 
full incorporation of it into the Fourteenth would be highly problematic. But to the extent that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”), is directed to arbitrary and discriminatory conduct 
by state officials, it can and should be read to impose some Fourth Amendment-type constraints. Beyond these 
preliminary thoughts, this Article remains agnostic on the incorporation question. 
 7 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 353–54 
(1974); see George C. Thomas III, The Eternally Young Fourth Amendment Common Law, 65 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 951, 951 (2013) (“[T]he Framers wrote the two clauses of the Fourth Amendment in very different 
ways.”). 
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A. The Court’s Reliance on the Common Law in Interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment 
The Court has increasingly looked to the common law circa 1791 in order 
to resolve a wide variety of Fourth Amendment issues that come before it. For 
example, in 1975, in Gerstein v. Pugh, the Court looked to the Fourth 
Amendment’s “common-law antecedents” in determining that a person 
arrested without a warrant could not be detained indefinitely absent a judicial 
determination of probable cause.8 The following year, in United States v. 
Watson, the Court relied in part on an “ancient common-law rule” in 
determining that an officer could make a public arrest for a felony without a 
warrant as long as “there was reasonable ground for making the arrest.”9 The 
Court again looked to the common law in distinguishing Watson four years 
later in Payton v. New York, holding that a warrant was needed to forcibly 
enter a home to make an arrest.10 
During this period, the Court did not always rely on the common law in 
interpreting the Fourth Amendment. For example, in Tennessee v. Garner, the 
Court explicitly rejected the common law rule permitting the use of deadly 
force against a fleeing felon, reasoning that “[b]ecause of sweeping change in 
the legal and technological context, reliance on the common-law rule in this 
case would be a mistaken literalism that ignores the purposes of a historical 
inquiry.”11 And even where the Court looked to the common law of 1791, that 
inquiry was typically informative but not dispositive. For example, in Gerstein, 
the Court’s examination of the common law played a supporting role for the 
Court’s balancing of law-enforcement and personal-liberty interests.12 
As a result of the influence of Justice Scalia after his appointment to the 
Supreme Court in 1986, however, the common-law antecedents to the Fourth 
Amendment began to take on added significance. In a trio of cases in 1991, 
Justice Scalia made clear that the common law of 1791 should be the first 
place to look in determining the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Writing 
for the Court in California v. Hodari D., Justice Scalia relied principally on the 
common-law understanding of the word “seizure” to clarify that a person has 
 
 8 420 U.S. 103, 111, 114–16 (1975). 
 9 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976). For a discussion of Watson, see infra Part I.B.1. 
 10 445 U.S. 573, 591–98 (1980). For a discussion of Payton, see infra Part I.B.2.b. 
 11 471 U.S. 1, 13 (1985); see Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1765 (observing that in Garner, the Court 
consciously deviated from common law). 
 12 420 U.S. at 113–14. 
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not been seized pursuant to the Fourth Amendment merely because he has 
been the target of an unsuccessful attempt to stop him via a show of 
authority.13 In his separate opinion in California v. Acevedo, after surveying 
the incoherence that Fourth Amendment law has wrought, he suggested that 
“the path out of this confusion should be sought by returning to the first 
principle that the ‘reasonableness’ requirement of the Fourth Amendment 
affords the protection that the common law afforded.”14 
Justice Scalia was careful not to suggest, however, that the Fourth 
Amendment affords only the protections of the common law. He made that 
point explicit in his dissent in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, in which he 
clarified that the Fourth Amendment might require balancing public-safety 
concerns against individual-liberty interests, “[b]ut not . . . in resolving those 
questions on which a clear answer already existed in 1791, and has been 
generally adhered to by the traditions of our society ever since.”15 The Fourth 
Amendment places such issues “beyond time, place, and judicial predilection, 
incorporating the traditional common-law guarantees against unlawful 
arrest.”16 
Within eight years, that two-tiered inquiry became solidified in the law, so 
that Justice Scalia could write for the Court in Wyoming v. Houghton: 
In determining whether a particular governmental action violates [the 
Fourth Amendment], we inquire first whether the action was regarded 
as an unlawful search or seizure under the common law when the 
Amendment was framed. Where that inquiry yields no answer, we 
must evaluate the search or seizure under traditional standards of 
 
 13 499 U.S. 621, 624–27 (1991); see Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1754 (observing significance of Hodari 
D. in the transformation of Justice Scalia’s thinking about common-law background of the Fourth 
Amendment); accord Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case 
Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 239, 258 & n.44 (2002). 
 14 500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); see Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1755–
56 (observing that Justice Scalia’s separate opinion in Acevedo suggests that the common-law background of 
Fourth Amendment provides a way to resolve “confusion and inconsistency” in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence); accord Davies, supra note 13, at 259. 
 15 500 U.S. 44, 60 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1755 (noting that 
Justice Scalia suggested in his McLaughlin dissent that “[t]he common law of arrest . . . should operate as a 
floor on Fourth Amendment protections,” but not a ceiling). 
 16 McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 66 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1755 (observing that 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in McLaughlin posited the common law of 1791 as “a safe harbor against political 
winds unfavorable to civil liberties”); see also Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 380 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“The purpose of the [Fourth Amendment] . . . is to preserve that degree of respect for the privacy 
of persons and the inviolability of their property that existed when the provision was adopted . . . .”). 
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reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it 
intrudes upon the individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to 
which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.17 
The Court has also interpreted the term “common law” broadly to include not 
just case law but “an amalgam of cases, statutes, commentary, custom, and 
fundamental principles.”18 For example, in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, the 
Court canvassed case law, statutes, and commentary from England and the 
United States to determine whether warrantless arrests for misdemeanors other 
than breach of the peace were permitted at common law.19 Thus, the Court 
looks to the entire legal landscape at the time of the framing to determine the 
common-law rule. If that produces no clear answer, the Court decides the issue 
based on “traditional standards of reasonableness.” 
B. The Court’s Treatment of Indeterminacy in the Common Law 
The two-step inquiry described above has engendered two distinct 
problems in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. First, the common law of 
search and seizure circa 1791 was virtually never clear nor uniform.20 Indeed, 
the second step of the Court’s two-part inquiry is premised on this reality. Yet, 
in a number of cases, the Court has papered over this indeterminacy and 
pretended that it does not exist. Second, the Court has not settled upon the path 
to take, even on those occasions where it has recognized this indeterminacy.21 
 
 17 526 U.S. 295, 299–300 (1999) (citations omitted); see Davies, supra note 13, at 259 (discussing 
Houghton); George C. Thomas III, Stumbling Toward History: The Framers’ Search and Seizure World, 43 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 199, 205 (2010) (same); see also Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 563 (1999) (“In deciding 
whether a challenged governmental action violates the [Fourth] Amendment, we have taken care to inquire 
whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search and seizure when the Amendment was framed.”). 
 18 Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1795; see also Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 327 (2001) 
(observing that common law could be “understood strictly as law judicially derived or, instead, as the whole 
body of law extant at the time of the framing”). 
 19 532 U.S. at 327–44.  
 20 See Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1707, 1717 
(1996) (reviewing William John Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning, 602–1791 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School 1990)) (“[L]egal rules [on search and seizure] not 
only varied over time but also were inconsistent at almost any point in time during the centuries preceding the 
adoption of the Fourth Amendment . . . .”); M. Blane Michael, Madison Lecture, Reading the Fourth 
Amendment: Guidance from the Mischief that Gave It Birth, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 905, 915 (2010) (“[T]he 
common law of 1791, which Justice Scalia casually refers to as though it were a single, clearly defined body of 
rules, was actually derived from a variety of authorities and differed from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.” 
(footnote omitted)); Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1744 (“Th[e] rules . . . were both hazier and less comprehensive 
than the Court has suggested . . . .”). 
 21 As Professor Tracey Maclin has put it: 
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1. Papering Over the Indeterminacy of the Common Law of 1791: The 
Illusion of Consensus 
In some cases, the Court pretends that there was a clear common-law rule 
in 1791 that forms a part of the Fourth Amendment’s superstructure. Yet, upon 
closer scrutiny, the supposed consensus turns out to be an illusion. For 
example, in United States v. Watson, the Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth 
Amendment permits public arrest without a warrant so long as there is 
probable cause to believe the suspect had committed a felony, in part relying 
on the pedigree of the common-law rule to that effect in 1791. Yet the rule in 
1791 was surprisingly unsettled. 
After Henry Watson was arrested without a warrant, but based on probable 
cause, for possession of a stolen credit card in a Los Angeles restaurant in 
1972, he argued that his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment.22 The Court 
rejected this argument, in part because it found that the Fourth Amendment 
encompassed “the ancient common-law rule that a peace officer was permitted 
to arrest without a warrant for a . . . felony not committed in his presence if 
there was reasonable ground for making the arrest.”23 For this proposition, the 
Court cited, among other sources, the 1780 English decision in Samuel v. 
Payne.24 
Yet, as Professor Thomas Davies points out, Americans of that time period 
would have viewed Samuel v. Payne as setting forth a novel rule of law, not an 
“ancient” one.25 Indeed, the trial judge in that case had held that a warrantless 
arrest was lawful only if a felony had in fact been committed by the arrestee, 
but the judges of the King’s Bench collectively disagreed and granted a new 
trial on the ground that it was sufficient if there were reasonable grounds to 
 
[T]he Supreme Court has not been consistent in juxtaposing the history of the Fourth 
Amendment with modern law enforcement techniques. In one case, history provides the driving 
force behind a ruling; in another, it is neglected even though the challenged police conduct is 
contrary to historical practice. In yet other cases, the meaning and weight of historical precedent 
sharply divide the Court. 
Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925, 926–27 
(1997) (footnotes omitted); see also Davies, supra note 13, at 260 (“[T]he Court’s recourse to framing-era 
doctrine to decide search and seizure issues is rather selective . . . .”).  
 22 See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 413–14 (1976); United States v. Watson, 504 F.2d 849, 
851–52 (9th Cir. 1974), rev’d, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). 
 23 Watson, 423 U.S. at 418. 
 24 See id. at 418–19. 
 25 See Davies, supra note 5, at 635 (“It is possible that some of the federal Framers may have heard of 
Samuel by 1789, but if so they would have understood it to be a novel English ruling.”). 
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believe a felony had been committed even if one had not.26 Unless the trial 
judge were guilty of the sheerest incompetence—unlikely, given that it was the 
esteemed Lord Mansfield27—the rule of law described by Watson as “ancient” 
was not even known to the framers and ratifiers of the Fourth Amendment only 
a few years prior to its ratification. 
It was also a rule that Americans were slow to adopt. Holley v. Mix,28 an 
1829 New York case, appears to have been the first on this side of the Atlantic 
to decide that a police officer could make a warrantless arrest based only on 
reasonable grounds, rather than certainty, that a felony had been committed.29 
Indeed, an 1814 Pennsylvania case held that a warrantless arrest could take 
place only if a felony had in fact had been committed, irrespective of the 
constable’s suspicions.30 The only other contemporaneous sources Watson 
cited for the proposition that public warrantless arrests were lawful if based on 
reasonable grounds—Blackstone and Hale31—“clearly stated the felony-in-fact 
requirement” instead.32 
 
 26 See Samuel v. Payne, (1780) 99 Eng. Rep. 230 (K.B.) 231; 1 Dougl. 359, 360; Davies, supra note 5, at 
634–36 (contrasting trial court ruling adopting “felony in fact” requirement from appellate court’s ruling 
allowing an arrest “on charge” of felony (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 27 See Davies, supra note 5, at 634. 
 28 3 Wend. 350, 353 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829). 
 29 See Davies, supra note 5, at 636; accord George C. Thomas III, Time Travel, Hovercrafts, and the 
Framers: James Madison Sees the Future and Rewrites the Fourth Amendment, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1451, 1472 (2005). 
 30 Wakely v. Hart, 6 Binn. 316, 318 (Pa. 1814); see Davies, supra note 5, at 633 n.227, 635–36; Thomas, 
supra note 29, at 1472–73. 
 31 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
*292; 2 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN *72–74). 
 32 See Davies, supra note 5, at 640 n.252; see also Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1802 (“[T]he rule regarding 
arrests in public places was far from clear-cut.”). Professor Thomas Davies has argued that “the ancient 
common-law rule” was settled at the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, but that it was precisely 
the opposite of the rule recognized in Watson: a warrantless public arrest was justified only if a felony had in 
fact occurred. See Davies, supra note 5, at 632 (asserting that official arrest authority at the founding existed 
only so far as allowing an officer to make an arrest “upon proof that ‘felony in fact’ had actually been 
committed by someone and that there was ‘probable cause of suspicion’ to think the arrestee was that person”). 
Yet, the sources he cites are in serious tension with this conclusion. For example, two Justice of the Peace 
manuals, one from 1793 and one from 1795, discussed both rules. See WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE NEW 
VIRGINIA JUSTICE 34 (Richmond, T. Nicolson 1795); Davies, supra note 5, at 635 n.237 (citing 1 RICHARD 
BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER *403 (Dublin, John Rice, 18th ed. 1793)); see also 
infra notes 83–84 (detailing Hening’s discussion of both rules). Moreover, contemporaneous commentary on 
the case describes the ruling in Samuel v. Payne as “the first determination of the point.” See Davies, supra 
note 5, at 635 n.237 (quoting Samuel v. Payne, (1780) 99 Eng. Rep. 230 (K.B.) 231 n.7; 1 Dougl. 359, 360 n.7 
and 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 120 n.(a) (Thomas Leach ed., London, 
Eliz. Lynch 6th ed. 1788)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting 
Search-and-Seizure History: Now-Forgotten Common-Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original 
Understanding of “Due Process of Law,” 77 MISS. L.J. 1, 185 n.585 (2007). This is strange language to use if 
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The common law on warrantless arrests on suspicion that a felony had been 
committed appears to have been unsettled as of 1791, but this lack of clarity 
was papered over by the Watson Court’s suggestion that its rule was backed by 
consensus from time immemorial. 
2. Facing the Indeterminacy of the Common Law of 1791 
Even when the Court has acknowledged indeterminacy in the common law 
of search and seizure of 1791, it has not provided a uniform account of where 
else it should look to resolve the Fourth Amendment question at issue. Worse, 
the Court’s approaches have been diametrically opposed to one another. In 
some cases, the Court concludes that the absence of a clear common-law rule 
in 1791 indicates that the search-and-seizure issue at hand is simply not 
governed by the Fourth Amendment and must be resolved by the political 
process. In other cases, in the absence of a clear common-law rule governing 
the specific issue, the Court falls back upon general Fourth Amendment 
principles that dictate a countermajoritarian result. 
a. Deference to Legislative Judgments in the Face of Indeterminacy 
In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, the Court confronted the question whether 
the Fourth Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth, prohibits a full 
custodial arrest for a crime that was punishable only by a fine.33 Gail Atwater 
had been arrested and taken into custody for violation of a Texas statute 
making it a misdemeanor, punishable by fifty-dollar fine, for the operator of a 
vehicle to fail to secure with a seatbelt any child riding in the front seat.34 The 
Court concluded that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments had not been 
violated. 
In the course of a lengthy excursion into the common-law antecedents of 
the Fourth Amendment,35 the Court found that neither the case law nor the 
commentary provided any clear answer regarding the common-law authority to 
arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor committed in the presence of the 
constable.36 For example, both William Blackstone and Edward East implied 
 
the court had actually reversed course from settled law. And Professor Davies does not dispute that Samuel 
was the first case to definitively address the issue. See Davies, supra, at 185 n.585. 
 33 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
 34 Id. at 323–24 (citing TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.413(b), (d) (West 1999)). 
 35 Id. at 326–40. 
 36 Id. at 328 (“[T]he common-law commentators (as well as the sparsely reported cases) reached 
divergent conclusions with respect to officers’ warrantless misdemeanor arrest power.”). 
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that warrantless arrest power for misdemeanors extended only to those 
involving breach of the peace.37 Yet Matthew Hale wrote that “a constable 
could arrest without a warrant ‘for breach of the peace and some 
misdemeanors, less than felony.’”38 Importantly, Hale’s view was reiterated in 
two of the most influential justice of the peace manuals in America.39 And 
William Hawkins agreed that a warrantless arrest was justified for a 
misdemeanor that was “scandalous and prejudicial to the public.”40 Nor did 
nineteenth-century courts adopt any particular “common-law rule with 
anything approaching unanimity.”41 
Thus, finding “disagreement, not unanimity, among both the common-law 
jurists and the text writers,” the Court had to decide the case on other 
grounds.42 Ultimately, the Court rejected the distinction between fine-only 
 
 37 See id. at 329–30 (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *289; 1 EDWARD HYDE EAST, A TREATISE 
OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN § 71, at 303 (London, A. Strahan 1803)). The Court warned that even 
Blackstone and East wrote only that breach of the peace was a sufficient, not a necessary, condition to 
warrantless arrest authority for a misdemeanor. See id. 
 38 Id. at 330 (quoting 2 HALE, supra note 31, at *88). 
 39 Id. (citing GILES JACOB, THE COMPLEAT PARRISH-OFFICER 11 (London, Henry Lintot 1744); 
1 RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER 271 (London, S. Sweet 28th ed. 1837)). 
 40 Id. at 331–32 (quoting 2 HAWKINS, supra note 32, § 20, at 122). 
 41 Id. at 341. Professor Davies disagreed with this conclusion and authored a lengthy article seeking to 
demonstrate that at the time of the framing, warrantless arrest authority generally extended only to felonies and 
to misdemeanors involving breach of the peace. See generally Davies, supra note 13. However, he allowed 
that there was some lack of clarity, given that “arrest authority regarding misdemeanors was so marginal that it 
was sometimes not discussed in legal commentaries at all.” Id. at 303 n.201. Moreover, he conceded that the 
general rule disallowing warrantless arrests for non-breach-of-the-peace misdemeanor offenses was “subject to 
specific exceptions to deal with situations that evidenced an unusual need for warrantless arrest authority.” 
Id. at 330; see also id. at 333. Specifically, his evidence demonstrated that the rule was riddled with exceptions 
in various jurisdictions. See, e.g., id. at 306 n.205 (describing a 1774 North Carolina justice of the peace 
manual permitting warrantless arrests for loitering, begging, idleness, and “disturbing the Minister in Time of 
Divine Service”); id. at 308–12 & n.220 (noting, among other sources, that a 1768 New York manual 
permitted warrantless arrests for offenses that were neither felonies nor breaches of the peace); id. at 332 n.284 
(citing a 1788 manual that included a “discussion of statutory arrest authority regarding unknown persons who 
profanely swear and persons observed begging”); id. at 341 n.319 (citing a Massachusetts statute permitting 
warrantless arrest of those “overtaken with drink . . . vagrant persons, [and] night-walkers”); id. at 343 n.322 
(citing a 1799 New Jersey statute permitting warrantless arrest of “vagrants or vagabonds, common drunkards, 
common night-walkers, and common prostitutes, as well as fortune-tellers and other practitioners of crafty 
science” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Finally, his evidence demonstrated that there were disagreements 
across different jurisdictions over warrantless arrest authority. See, e.g., id. at 350 (observing that while “New 
Jersey . . . preserved warrantless arrest authority for all kinds of violations of the Sabbath as late as 1798 . . . . 
other states seem to have been retreating from such authority”); id. at 353 (observing that warrantless arrest 
authority “for the offenses of ‘hawking’ and ‘peddling’” existed in New York and South Carolina but not 
Massachusetts); id. at 329 n.268 (noting conflict over whether “nightwalkers could . . . be arrested unless they 
were engaged in some specific unlawful act”). 
 42 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 332.  
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offenses and others for two reasons. First, the Court determined that such a 
distinction would be exceedingly difficult to administer, as the degree of 
severity of the offense might not be readily apparent to the police officer 
responsible for making the decision whether to arrest.43 Second, the Court 
relied on local decisionmaking to address whatever problem was raised by 
warrantless misdemeanor arrests.44 Noting that many States did limit by statute 
warrantless arrest authority for misdemeanors, the Court observed that the 
States should be motivated to enact such limits because of the costs associated 
with arrests for petty offenses.45 And, the Court suggested, “the political 
accountability[] of most local lawmakers and law-enforcement officials” 
should prevent arrest practices that are onerous to the general public from 
being enacted and enforced.46 
The Court admitted that Atwater’s arrest, when viewed in isolation, could 
be considered to contravene “traditional standards of reasonableness.”47 Her 
“claim to live free of pointless indignity and confinement clearly 
outweigh[ed]” any governmental interest.48 Yet, the Court decided otherwise 
based on considerations of administrative convenience and on a 
representation-reinforcing view of the Fourth Amendment.49 In other cases, 
however, “traditional standards of reasonableness” have pointed in the 
opposite direction, privileging the individual interest to be free from intrusions 
at the expense of administrative efficiency and democratic rulemaking. 
b. Reliance on General Fourth Amendment Values in the Face of 
Indeterminacy 
In Payton v. New York, the Court considered whether the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments require police to obtain a warrant to forcibly enter a 
home to arrest a suspect absent exigent circumstances.50 Looking to the 
common law circa 1791, the Court found “a surprising lack of judicial 
 
 43 See id. at 347–51.  
 44 See id. at 352–54.  
 45 Id. at 352.  
 46 Id. at 353. 
 47 Id. at 346.  
 48 Id. at 347. 
 49 Richard S. Frase, What Were They Thinking? Fourth Amendment Unreasonableness in Atwater v. City 
of Lago Vista, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 329, 401 (2002) (“[T]he Court’s decision in Atwater might be seen as 
promoting democratic goals . . . by leaving almost all arrest-limiting decisions to the legislative or executive 
branches.”). 
 50 445 U.S. 573, 576, 581–82 (1980). 
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decisions and a deep divergence among scholars” on the legality of forcible, 
in-home, warrantless arrests.51 For example, “[t]he most cited evidence” in 
support of a common-law rule that warrants for in-home arrests of suspected 
felons were not required “consist[ed] of an equivocal dictum” in Semayne’s 
Case, a case involving a service of civil process, which indicated that in 
criminal cases, the authorities must knock and demand entry before breaking 
doors, but did not specifically mention warrants.52 Moreover, “[t]he 
common-law commentators disagreed sharply on the subject.”53 Indeed, at 
least three distinct approaches appear. Coke, Burn, Foster, and Hawkins took 
the extreme view that not even a warrant permitted breaking of doors of a 
dwelling; rather, breaking of doors was permitted only after the arrestee had 
been indicted.54 East and Russell took the more moderate approach that no 
warrant was necessary if the suspect were actually guilty, but only a warrant 
could justify breaking doors to arrest someone who turned out to be innocent.55 
And Blackstone, Chitty, and Stephen were of the view that no warrant was 
necessary at all to make an in-home arrest for a felony.56 This last view was so 
widely adhered to as late as 1761 that an attorney in the Boston writs of 
assistance case in that year could state with confidence: “Every Body knows 
 
 51 Id. at 592. 
 52 Id. at 592–93 (citing Semayne’s Case, (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B.) 195–96; 5 Co. Rep. 91 a, 91 b); 
see Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Death of Suspicion, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1275, 1300 n.69 (2010) (“The popular 
reading of Semayne’s Case [that a warrant is required to break doors] is too broad because the opinion 
repeatedly took pains to preserve governmental authority to search private homes in cases in which the king 
was involved.”). 
 53 Payton, 445 U.S. at 593; see also id. at 606 (White., J., dissenting) (“[C]ommentators have differed as 
to the scope of the constable’s inherent authority, when not acting under a warrant, to break doors in order to 
arrest.”); Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1801–02 (“[C]ommon-law commentators differed widely on th[is] 
question: some, including Coke, disallowed warrantless entries for purpose of arrest, except in case of hot 
pursuit; others, including Blackstone, allowed such entries; and still others, including Hale, appeared to 
equivocate.”). 
 54 See Payton, 445 U.S. at 593–95 & nn.37–38 (citing EDW. COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE 
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 177 (London, M. Flesher 1644); 1 RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE 
PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER 87 (London, Henry Lintot 6th ed. 1758); MICHAEL FOSTER, CROWN LAW 321 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press 1762); 2 HAWKINS, supra note 32, at 139). 
 55 Id. at 595 & n.39 (citing 1 EDWARD HYDE EAST, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 322 
(Philadelphia, P. Byrne 1806); 1 WILLIAM RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 745 
(London, J. & T. Clarke 1819)). According to Thomas, supra note 17, at 233, Foster actually adhered to this 
view as well. 
 56 Payton, 445 U.S. at 595 & n.40 (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, at *292; 1 J. CHITTY, A 
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 23 (London, A.J. Valpy 1816); 4 HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, NEW 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 359 (London, C. Roworth & Sons 1845)); see also Thomas, supra 
note 17, at 231 (“Though the Court is correct that history does not speak with a single voice on this issue, it 
preponderates in favor of the view that warrants were not necessary for arrests in the home if the officer had 
adequate cause to suspect that the arrestee had committed a felony.”). 
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that the subject has the Priviledge of House only against his fellow subjects, 
not vs. the King either in matters of Crime or fine.”57 
Given that the question of the legality of warrantless entry into the home 
was not “definitively settled by the common law at the time the Fourth 
Amendment was adopted,”58 the Court had to rely on other considerations. 
Unlike the Atwater Court, however, which would be willing to leave the 
question up to the political process, the Payton Court concluded that the fact 
that “[o]nly 24 of the 50 States”—that is, nearly half—permitted “warrantless 
entries into the home to arrest” was not dispositive.59 The Court also did not 
find it significant that Congress had neither permitted nor forbidden in-home 
warrantless arrests, interpreting congressional silence as a neutral factor 
instead.60 And in sharp contrast to the way in which the Court would later rule 
in Atwater, in Payton it glossed over the serious administrability problems with 
the rule it propounded. As the dissent charged, a rule requiring a warrant for a 
forcible in-home arrest unless there are exigent circumstances is far from a 
bright-line rule. To the contrary, “police officers will often face the difficult 
task of deciding whether the circumstances are sufficiently exigent to justify 
their entry to arrest without a warrant.”61 
Instead, the Court relied on the general solicitude for the home represented 
by the common law and the Fourth Amendment and took the haziness of the 
common law as militating toward a rule requiring warrants for in-home arrests: 
“[T]he absence of any 17th- or 18th-century English cases directly in point, 
together with the unequivocal endorsement of the tenet that ‘a man’s house is 
his castle,’ strongly suggests that the prevailing practice was not to make such 
arrests.”62 Likewise, the Court wrote that “neither history nor this Nation’s 
experience requires us to disregard the overriding respect for the sanctity of the 
home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the 
Republic.”63 Accordingly, the Court concluded, the presumptive 
 
 57 John Adams, Minutes of the Argument in Petition of Lechmere (Feb. 24, 1761), in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF 
JOHN ADAMS 123, 130 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965); see also Sklansky, supra note 1, at 
1761 n.143. 
 58 Payton, 445 U.S. at 598. 
 59 Id. at 600 (emphasis added). 
 60 See id. at 601. 
 61 Id. at 619 (White, J., dissenting). 
 62 Id. at 598 (majority opinion). 
 63 Id. at 601. 
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unconstitutionality of official forcible entry into a home without a warrant 
applies to seizures of persons as well as of objects.64 
* * * 
The Court’s increasing reliance on the common law circa 1791 has led to 
increasingly unpredictable results. One can never be certain whether the Court 
will hide the uncertainty of the common law via overly broad pronouncements 
on the consensus that supposedly existed in 1791, as with the 
bare-probable-cause-to-arrest standard in Watson, or whether it will instead 
straightforwardly concede that there was no consensus on the particular issue, 
as in Atwater and Payton. And if it takes the latter approach, one never can 
predict what the Supreme Court will consider reasonable.65 
It may well be that the foregoing suggests that the Court’s entire enterprise 
in attempting to discern the common-law search-and-seizure rules of 1791 
should be abandoned. However, to whatever extent the Court is justified in 
using the common law of 1791 as the benchmark for its Fourth Amendment 
decisions, a more nuanced approach is called for. Indeed, a closer look at the 
common law of searches and seizures during the framing period reveals that 
the Court’s cases merely scratch the surface of the indeterminacy of the law at 
that time. 
II. THE CONTINGENCY OF THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE DURING THE 
FRAMING PERIOD 
It is unsurprising that the U.S. Supreme Court’s struggle to discover the 
common law of searches and seizures circa 1791 has been largely 
unsuccessful. While some general principles were universal, the common law 
was to a large extent indeterminate, and “search-and-seizure rules . . . varied 
from colony to colony and from decade to decade.”66 A look at the law of 
search and seizure, as manifested in both the justice of the peace manuals of 
the time and statutory authority for customs searches, confirms this basic 
insight. 
 
 64 See id. at 590 (“In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the 
Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house.”). 
 65 See Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1774 (“The Court has left itself more than enough wiggle room to 
respond however it wants.”). 
 66 Id. at 1795. 
MANNHEIMER PROOFS2 5/7/2015  10:43 AM 
1246 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1229 
A. The Justice of the Peace Manuals 
Modern courts and commentators sometimes overlook three truths about 
search-and-seizure doctrine in the lead-up to ratification of the Bill of Rights. 
First, the common law of search and seizure in 1791 was underdeveloped, 
given “the limited range of questions that eighteenth-century judges and 
commentators asked about searches and seizures.”67 Second, while the law was 
uniform in some respects, there were also significant differences of opinion.68 
That is because some of the very same principles we take for granted today 
were in sharp dispute at the time.69 Finally, the common law was dynamic, 
changing over time as new rules were adopted and old ones discarded, both 
judicially and legislatively.70 
Examination of the justice of the peace manuals used by the various 
jurisdictions in the critical three decades prior to the adoption of the Bill of 
Rights71 reveals some of the haziness, the contentiousness, and the dynamism 
that characterized the common law of search and seizure. These manuals were 
derived from treatises and other earlier works,72 and “addressed . . . legal 
matters relevant to justices of the peace and other parish and county level 
officers, including constables.”73 They “were often quite substantial,” and most 
contained different sections dealing with arrests, arrest warrants, constables, 
and search warrants.74 Professor Davies has observed that “[t]hese were 
probably the sources regarding criminal procedure that were most accessible to 
 
 67 Id. at 1744; see also Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 1014 (2011) (observing that “search and seizure principles were [not] fully 
formed” during the framing period). 
 68 See Clancy, supra note 67, at 1014 (observing that treatises during the framing period demonstrated no 
“consensus as to proper practices”). 
 69 See id. at 1053 (“Many of the principles that remain today as core search and seizure concerns were 
being litigated at that time.”). 
 70 See Cloud, supra note 20, at 1716 (“Search and seizure law was dynamic in that it changed over 
time.”); Donald A. Dripps, Responding to the Challenges of Contextual Change and Legal Dynamism in 
Interpreting the Fourth Amendment, 81 MISS. L.J. 1085, 1121 (2011) (“The Framers . . . knew that 
common-law doctrine could change. Rules of the common law could be changed judicially [or] . . . . by the 
legislature . . . .”). 
 71 I have focused on this time period because even those who assert that search-and-seizure principles 
were largely settled and uniform as of the framing period acknowledge that there was more diversity prior 
thereto. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 13, at 282 n.123 (“[M]any of the earlier historical controversies and 
uncertainties were treated as settled by the framing era itself.”). 
 72 See Davies, supra note 32, at 72–73 (observing that these manuals were largely derived from the 
“leading English manual . . . Richard Burn’s Justice of the Peace and Parish Officer,” which in turn drew 
heavily from Hawkins, Hale, and other treatise writers); accord Davies, supra note 13, at 276–77, 278 n.121. 
 73 See Davies, supra note 13, at 278 n.121. 
 74 See id. 
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members of the Framers’ generation.”75 And Professor John Conley’s research 
suggests that “the American justices relied on their manual as their primary 
source of legal reference.”76 
Importantly, different versions of the manuals were used in different 
colonies and States at different times during the founding period.77 That very 
fact should give us pause before we conclude that the law was uniform. And a 
comparison of ten of these manuals published between 1761 to 179578 
confirms that, during this period, search-and-seizure law was both fairly 
differentiated rather than uniform across the geographic boundaries of the 
thirteen colonies and States, and that there was change over time within 
particular jurisdictions. 
It is true that the differences among the justice of the peace manuals are 
relatively minor. Moreover, many of the differences take the form, not of 
outright contradiction, but of omission of material in one manual that appears 
 
 75 Id. at 280. 
 76 John A. Conley, Doing It by the Book: Justice of the Peace Manuals and English Law in Eighteenth 
Century America, 6 J. LEGAL HIST. 257, 265 (1985). 
 77 See Davies, supra note 13, at 280 n.122 (“Given the locations at which American versions of justice of 
the peace manuals were printed, as well as statements in the various prefaces, it appears that they were often 
oriented to particular colonies/states.”). For a helpful summary of the American justice of the peace manuals, 
organized by place of publication, see Conley, supra note 76, at 294–95. 
 78 In chronological order, these manuals are as follows: WILLIAM SIMPSON, THE PRACTICAL JUSTICE OF 
THE PEACE AND PARISH-OFFICER, OF HIS MAJESTY’S PROVINCE OF SOUTH-CAROLINA (Charlestown, Robert 
Wells 1761); JAMES PARKER, CONDUCTOR GENERALIS: OR, THE OFFICE, DUTY AND AUTHORITY OF JUSTICES 
OF THE PEACE, HIGH-SHERIFFS, UNDER-SHERIFFS, CORONERS, CONSTABLES, GAOLERS, JURY-MEN, AND 
OVERSEERS OF THE POOR (Woodbridge, James Parker 1764) (New Jersey); JOSEPH GREENLEAF, AN 
ABRIDGEMENT OF BURN’S JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER (Boston, Joseph Greenleaf 1773) 
(Massachusetts); JAMES DAVIS, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF PEACE (Newbern, James Davis 
1774) (North Carolina); RICHARD STARKE, THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF PEACE EXPLAINED 
AND DIGESTED, UNDER PROPER TITLES (Williamsburg, Alexander Purdie & John Dixon 1774) (Virginia); THE 
CONDUCTOR GENERALIS: OR, THE OFFICE, DUTY AND AUTHORITY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, HIGH-SHERIFFS, 
UNDER-SHERIFFS, CORONERS, CONSTABLES, GAOLERS, JURY-MEN, AND OVERSEERS OF THE POOR (New York, 
Hugh Gaine 1788) [hereinafter 1788 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS] (New York); THE SOUTH-CAROLINA JUSTICE 
OF PEACE (Philadelphia, R. Aitken & Son 1788); THE CONDUCTOR GENERALIS: OR, THE OFFICE, DUTY AND 
AUTHORITY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, HIGH-SHERIFFS, UNDER-SHERIFFS, CORONERS, CONSTABLES, 
GAOLERS, JURY-MEN, AND OVERSEERS OF THE POOR (Philadelphia, Robert Campbell 1792) [hereinafter 1792 
CONDUCTOR GENERALIS] (New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania); ELIPHALET LADD, BURN’S 
ABRIDGEMENT, OR THE AMERICAN JUSTICE; CONTAINING THE WHOLE PRACTICE, AUTHORITY AND DUTY OF 
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE (Dover, Eliphalet Ladd 2d ed. 1792) (New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Vermont); 
and HENING, supra note 32 (Virginia). 
  Two slightly different versions of the 1788 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS were published. This Article 
refers to the version printed by Hugh Gaine. 
  The 1788 South Carolina manual was published anonymously but has been attributed to John F. 
Grimké. See Conley, supra note 76, at 280; Davies, supra note 13, at 281 n.122. 
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in another, or equivocation on a legal point in one that is stated more 
forthrightly in another. Yet the authors of these manuals were, for the most 
part, experienced lawyers and judges.79 As good lawyers know, omission of 
terms or conditions from any legal document can be highly significant, and 
equivocal directives give actors far more discretion than those stated more 
definitively. The question is how these minor differences in wording, when 
translated into action by real justices and constables, would have played out in 
real life, for common law doctrine was inextricably and symbiotically 
intertwined with custom and usage: legal doctrine guided conduct, and 
conduct, in turn, determined law.80 However minor the differences in the 
manuals were, they likely resulted in different customs—and therefore 
different law—when operationalized by legal actors. 
1. Differences in the Common Law of Search and Seizure Expressed in the 
Founding-Era Justice of the Peace Manuals 
A careful comparison among the justice of the peace manuals used in North 
America from 1761 to 1795 reveals at least nine significant differences in the 
common law of search and seizure based on location and time period. 
a. The Felony-in-Fact Requirement for Warrantless Arrests 
One point on which the justice of the peace manuals differ is the issue 
raised by United States v. Watson: whether a felony in fact was required for a 
warrantless arrest or, rather, reasonable grounds for suspicion that a felony had 
been committed were sufficient.81 Again, the 1780 English case Samuel v. 
Payne contains the first determination of this question.82 Of the justice of the 
peace manuals that post-date the decision in that case, only the 1795 Virginia 
manual discusses the possibility that “reasonable probable grounds of 
suspicion” of a felony is sufficient justification for an arrest, even if no felony 
had in fact been committed.83 This discussion immediately followed a 
reiteration of the more conventional rule: “[G]enerally, no . . . cause of 
suspicion . . . will justify an arrest, where in truth no such crime hath been 
 
 79 See infra notes 143–50 and accompanying text. 
 80 See John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to 
Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1768 (2008) (observing that for “[t]hose who practiced and wrote 
about the common law in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,” common law meant “the law of ‘long use’ 
and ‘custom’”). 
 81 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976); see supra Part I.B.1. 
 82 Samuel v. Payne, (1780) 99 Eng. Rep. 230 (K.B.) 231; 1 Dougl. 359, 360. 
 83 See HENING, supra note 32, at 34. 
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committed.”84 Thus, the Virginia manual set forth two inconsistent rules 
without picking a side. More significantly, the two manuals published in 
1792—by which time the decade-old decision in Samuel v. Payne might have 
been known to at least some in America85—did not mention that decision at all 
and set forth only the more conventional rule.86 
b. Breaking of Doors to Arrest 
The manuals also differed over the issue raised in Payton v. New York: 
what circumstances permitted the breaking of doors to make an arrest.87 As the 
Payton Court suggested, three distinct positions are evident.88 The strictest 
rule—discussed but not necessarily endorsed by the 1764 New Jersey manual, 
the 1773 Massachusetts manual, the 1788 New York manual, and the 1792 
New England and mid-Atlantic manuals—was the rule advocated by Coke89 
that “where one lies under a probable suspicion only, and is not indicted, it 
seems the better opinion at this day (Mr. Hawkins says) that no one can justify 
the breaking open of doors in order to apprehend him.”90 However, these 
manuals immediately went on to suggest a second, more modern rule: “But 
lord Hale, in his history of the pleas of the crown, says, that upon a warrant for 
probable cause of suspicion of felony, the person to whom such warrant is 
directed, may break open doors to take the person suspected.”91 
By stark contrast, the 1761 and 1788 South Carolina manuals did not even 
suggest the Cokean limitations on granting warrants or on breaking of doors to 
cases where the putative arrestee has already been indicted. They stated 
without reservation that “upon a warrant for probable cause of suspicion of 
 
 84 Id. 
 85 Cf. Davies, supra note 5, at 635 (“It is possible that some of the federal Framers may have heard of 
Samuel by 1789 . . . .”). 
 86 See 1792 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 78, at 25; LADD, supra note 78, at 40. 
 87 445 U.S. 573, 574, 581–82 (1980); see supra Part I.B.2.b. 
 88 See id. at 593–95. 
 89 See supra text accompanying note 54; see also Davies, supra note 32, at 65 (“Coke insisted that only a 
post-indictment felony arrest warrant, but not a pre-indictment warrant, could justify breaking a house.”). 
 90 See 1788 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 78, at 27 (emphasis omitted); 1792 CONDUCTOR 
GENERALIS, supra note 78, at 27 (emphasis omitted); GREENLEAF, supra note 78, at 24–25 (emphasis omitted); 
LADD, supra note 78, at 42–43 (emphasis omitted); PARKER, supra note 78, at 29 (emphasis omitted). 
 91 See 1788 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 78, at 27 (emphasis omitted); 1792 CONDUCTOR 
GENERALIS, supra note 78, at 27 (emphasis omitted); GREENLEAF, supra note 78, at 25 (emphasis omitted); 
LADD, supra note 78, at 43 (emphasis omitted); PARKER, supra note 78, at 29 (emphasis omitted). 
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felony, the person to whom such warrant is directed may break open doors to 
take the person suspected.”92 
Finally, the 1774 Virginia and North Carolina manuals provided a middle 
ground. They did not suggest that an indictment was required for breaking of 
doors, but neither did they state that doors could be broken with a warrant 
issued upon mere “probable cause of suspicion of felony.” Instead, both 
permitted breaking of doors only where one has been indicted or upon a 
warrant for one “who is known to have committed [t]reason, or [f]elony” (in 
Virginia),93 or simply “a [f]elon” (in North Carolina).94 And, interestingly, the 
1795 Virginia manual, without choosing sides, provided both this rule and the 
more traditional Cokean rule requiring an indictment before doors could be 
broken.95 
c. Issuance of Arrest Warrant Prior to Indictment 
The manuals also differed over an issue similar to whether an indictment 
was necessary to breaking of doors to arrest: whether an arrest warrant could 
be issued at all absent an indictment. The 1764 New Jersey manual, the 1773 
Massachusetts manual, the 1788 New York and South Carolina manuals, and 
the 1792 mid-Atlantic and New England manuals mentioned an extreme 
limitation advocated by Coke: that an arrest warrant could not be issued prior 
to indictment.96 It is true that the manuals then strongly suggested that Coke 
ought not be followed, but they again did not explicitly pick a side in this 
controversy.97 By contrast, the 1761 South Carolina and 1774 Virginia 
 
 92 SIMPSON, supra note 78, at 25; accord THE SOUTH-CAROLINA JUSTICE OF PEACE, supra note 78, at 20. 
 93 STARKE, supra note 78, at 17. 
 94 DAVIS, supra note 78, at 15. 
 95 See HENING, supra note 32, at 37 (“[W]here one lies under a probable suspicion only, and is not 
indicted . . . no one can justify the breaking open doors in order to apprehend him . . . .”). 
 96 See 1788 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 78, at 366–67; 1792 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra 
note 78, at 366–67; GREENLEAF, supra note 78, at 372; LADD, supra note 78, at 418; PARKER, supra note 78, 
at 457; THE SOUTH-CAROLINA JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, supra note 78, at 492–93. 
 97 They stated: 
Lord Hale proves at large, contrary to the opinion of lord Coke that a justice hath power to 
issue a warrant to apprehend a person suspected of felony, before he is indicted . . . .  
. . . I think, says [Hale], the law is not so, and the constant practice in all cases hath obtained 
against it, and it would be pernicious to the kingdom if it should be as lord Coke delivers it . . . . 
Mr. Hawkins likewise seems to be of the same opinion against lord Coke, but delivererth 
himself with his wonted caution and candour: It seems probable, he says, that the practice of 
justices of the peace in relation to this matter, is now become a law, and that a justice may justify 
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manuals stated without hesitation: “A Justice hath power to issue a warrant to 
apprehend a person suspected of felony, before he is indicted.”98 
d. Grounds for Warrantless Arrest 
The manuals also vary widely with respect to the grounds for making a 
warrantless arrest. For example, among the traditional causes of suspicion that 
would justify warrantless arrest was “[t]he common Fame of the Country.”99 
This was listed as the very first ground for a warrantless arrest in seven of the 
manuals.100 Yet it was omitted entirely from the 1761 South Carolina manual 
and the 1774 North Carolina and Virginia manuals.101 In addition, four of the 
manuals—the 1773 Massachusetts, 1788 South Carolina, 1792 New England, 
and 1795 Virginia manuals—permitted the warrantless arrests of night 
walkers102 whereas the other six did not.103 Finally, nine of the ten manuals 
 
the granting of a warrant for the arrest of any person, upon strong grounds of suspicion, for a 
felony or other misdemeanor, before any indictment hath been found against him . . . . 
PARKER, supra note 78, at 457 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted); accord 1788 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, 
supra note 78, at 366–67; 1792 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 78, at 366–67; GREENLEAF, supra 
note 78, at 372–73; LADD, supra note 78, at 418–19; THE SOUTH-CAROLINA JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, supra note 
78, at 492–93. 
 98 SIMPSON, supra note 78, at 258; accord STARKE, supra note 78, at 351. Professor Davies has claimed 
that Coke’s position on issuing pre-indictment arrest warrants was discussed in some manuals of the time 
“only as a point of historical interest” and that the contrary position of Hale “had clearly won out by the 
eighteenth century.” Davies, supra note 13, at 283 n.125. For this proposition, however, he cites nothing but 
the manuals themselves. See id. And he does not explain why some manuals would contain this “point of 
historical interest” and others would not. See id. 
 99 See Davies, supra note 5, at 632 n.226 (alteration in original) (quoting 2 HAWKINS, supra note 32, at 
76) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Davies, supra note 32, at 74 n.222. 
 100 See PARKER, supra note 78, at 26 (“[T]he causes of suspicion, which are generally agreed to justify the 
arrest of an innocent person for felony, are . . . [t]he common fame of the country; but it seems, that it ought to 
appear upon evidence, in an action brought for such arrest, that such fame had some probable ground.”); 
accord 1788 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 78, at 24; 1792 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 78, at 
24; GREENLEAF, supra note 78, at 22; HENING, supra note 32, at 33; LADD, supra note 78, at 39; THE 
SOUTH-CAROLINA JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, supra note 78, at 17. 
 101 See DAVIS, supra note 78, at 14–16; SIMPSON, supra note 78, at 23; STARKE, supra note 78, at 16. 
 102 See GREENLEAF, supra note 78, at 23 (“[A] watchman may arrest a night walker, without any warrant 
from a magistrate.”); accord HENING, supra note 32, at 35; LADD, supra note 78, at 40; THE SOUTH-CAROLINA 
JUSTICE OF PEACE, supra note 78, at 18. 
 103 See 1788 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 78, at 25–26; 1792 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 
78, at 25–26; DAVIS, supra note 78, at 14–16; PARKER, supra note 78, at 27–28; SIMPSON, supra note 78, at 
23–24; STARKE, supra note 78, at 16; see also Davies, supra note 13, at 345 n.333 (noting absence of authority 
to arrest night walkers in 1761 South Carolina manual). Even where there was agreement that night walkers 
could be arrested, there was some dispute over who had the power to make such arrests. See Thomas, supra 
note 17, at 226 (observing that “Coke said that only watchmen could make night-walker arrests” while 
Matthew “Bacon claimed . . . that any person could arrest a ‘Night-Walker’”). 
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permitted warrantless arrest of vagrants,104 but the 1774 Virginia manual did 
not.105 
e. Authority to Search Incident to Arrest 
Another highly significant difference among the manuals is that only one, 
the 1764 New Jersey manual, reprinted an instructional essay for constables by 
English justice of the peace and former high constable Saunders Welch.106 The 
1758 Welch essay has been cited as authority for police “search incident to 
arrest” power, the notion that the Fourth Amendment permits searches of the 
person of the arrestee and his immediately surrounding area upon arrest.107 
Welch observed that the law allowed the constable “to disarm and bind his 
prisoner” upon arrest.108 He elaborated: 
[A] thorough search of a felon is of the utmost consequence to your 
own safety, and the benefit of the public, as by this means he will be 
deprived of instruments of mischief, and evidence may probably be 
found on him sufficient to convict him, of which, if he has either time 
or opportunity allowed him, he will be sure to find some means to get 
rid of.109 
By stark contrast, the other manuals, including the 1792 revision of the 
1764 manual, do not contain the Welch essay or any other reference to 
searches incident to arrest,110 suggesting that searches incident to arrest were 
not universally considered customary. Indeed, the preface to the 1764 New 
 
 104 SIMPSON, supra note 78, at 23 (permitting arrest of those “living an idle, vagrant and disorderly life, 
without having any visible means to support it”); accord 1788 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 78, at 25; 
1792 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 78, at 25; GREENLEAF, supra note 78, at 22; HENING, supra note 32, 
at 34; LADD, supra note 78, at 40; PARKER, supra note 78, at 26; THE SOUTH-CAROLINA JUSTICE OF PEACE, 
supra note 78, at 18; see also DAVIS, supra note 78, at 120 (observing that the constable “must endeavour to 
apprehend Rogues, Vagabonds, and idle Persons, wandring, or begging, or found loitering within his 
Precinct”). 
 105 See STARKE, supra note 78, at 16–17, 103–05 (omitting such grounds); see also Davies, supra note 13, 
at 347 (“[R]eferences to warrantless arrest authority for vagrancy were omitted in several late 
eighteenth-century American justice of the peace manuals.”). As noted above, statutory authority for 
warrantless arrests also differed significantly among jurisdictions. See supra note 41. 
 106 See PARKER, supra note 78, at 111–24. 
 107 See Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 630–31 & 631 n.2 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
 108 See PARKER, supra note 78, at 117. 
 109 See id. 
 110 See 1792 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 78, at 97–100; DAVIS, supra note 78, at 115–23; 
GREENLEAF, supra note 78, at 102 (no entry for “Constable”); HENING, supra note 32, at 135–37; LADD, supra 
note 78, at 110 (no entry for “Constable”); SIMPSON, supra note 78, at 84–87; STARKE, supra note 78, at 103–
05; THE SOUTH-CAROLINA JUSTICE OF PEACE, supra note 78, at 117–22.  
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Jersey manual, which includes the essay, characterizes it as “a curious tract.”111 
It may be that the Welch essay, and search-incident-to-arrest authority, was 
included tentatively in the 1764 edition as a sort of curiosity and rejected in 
other manuals as an outdated or foreign oddity. But whatever the reason, the 
authority of a constable to search incident to arrest is nowhere mentioned in the 
other manuals.112 
f. Liability for Fruitless Forcible Entries 
Another difference among the manuals relates to whether they address 
liability for two kinds of fruitless forcible entries. Seven of the ten manuals 
provided that if a prospective arrestee is thought to be in the house of a third 
party, and one breaks doors to apprehend him, but the prospective arrestee is 
not there, the one who attempted to make the arrest is liable to the owner in 
trespass.113 In a similar vein, these manuals provided that if a private person 
(but not a constable) broke doors to make an arrest “barely upon suspicion of 
felony,” and the arrestee turned out to be innocent, the person who made the 
arrest was liable for damages.114 The 1761 South Carolina manual and the 
1774 North Carolina and Virginia manuals contained no such restrictions,115 
indicating that the law in these colonies either gave those making arrests more 
leeway to be in error or was simply unclear. However, by 1788 and 1795, 
liability in such situations apparently was sufficiently clear in South Carolina 
 
 111 PARKER, supra note 78, at iii. 
 112 It should be noted that the Welch essay appears in one version of the 1788 New York manual but not 
another. Compare 1788 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 78, at 97–100 (omitting the essay), with 
CONDUCTOR GENERALIS: OR THE OFFICE, DUTY AND AUTHORITY OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE, HIGH-SHERIFFS, 
UNDER-SHERIFFS, CORONERS, CONSTABLES, GOALERS, JURY-MEN, AND OVERSEERS OF THE POOR 109–24 
(New York, John Patterson 1788) (including the essay). Thus, there may have been confusion over 
search-incident-to-arrest authority even in a single jurisdiction at a single point in time. 
 113 See PARKER, supra note 78, at 29 (noting that when one to whom a warrant is directed “break[s] open 
the house of another to take [the felon] . . . he must at his peril see that the felon is there; for if the felon be not 
there, he is a trespasser to the stranger whose house it is”); accord 1788 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 
78, at 27; 1792 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 78, at 27; GREENLEAF, supra note 78, at 25; HENING, 
supra note 32, at 37; LADD, supra note 78, at 43; THE SOUTH-CAROLINA JUSTICE OF PEACE, supra note 78, at 
20. 
 114 See PARKER, supra note 78, at 29 (“[I]t seems that he that arrests as a private man barely upon 
suspicion of felony, cannot justify the breaking open of doors to arrest the party suspected, but he doth it at his 
peril, that is if in truth he be a felon, then it is justifiable, but if he be innocent, but upon a reasonable cause 
suspected, it is not justifiable.” (emphasis omitted)). The manuals go on to say that “a constable in such [a] 
case may justify.” Id. (emphasis omitted); accord 1788 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 78, at 27; 
1792 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 78, at 27; GREENLEAF, supra note 78, at 25; HENING, supra note 32, 
at 37; LADD, supra note 78, at 43; THE SOUTH-CAROLINA JUSTICE OF PEACE, supra note 78, at 20. 
 115 See DAVIS, supra note 78, at 15–16; SIMPSON, supra note 78, at 25–26; STARKE, supra note 78, at 17. 
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and Virginia, respectively, to call for inclusion of these provisions in the 
manuals published in those years.116 
g. Nocturnal Arrests and Searches 
The manuals also differed with respect to how they addressed nocturnal 
searches and arrests. Most explicitly allowed nocturnal arrests, on the theory 
that if an arrest were not made immediately when proper grounds appear, the 
putative arrestee might escape.117 By contrast, the 1761 South Carolina manual 
did not explicitly mention nocturnal arrests at all.118 However, by 1788, South 
Carolina had apparently adopted the majority rule on nocturnal arrests.119 
As for nocturnal searches, a number of different variations on the same 
theme are present in the manuals. The 1774 North Carolina manual restated 
Hale’s120 condemnation of nocturnal searches as “very inconvenient” if not 
“unlawful.”121 By contrast, the 1764 New Jersey, 1773 Massachusetts, and 
1788 South Carolina and New York manuals generally barred nocturnal 
searches but permitted such searches when there was “positive proof” that 
stolen goods were in a premises, based on the same “exigent circumstances” 
theory set forth for nocturnal arrests.122 These provisions were retained in the 
1792 New England and mid-Atlantic manuals.123 In yet another variation, the 
1774 Virginia manual also cited the same page of Hale’s treatise but grafted 
 
 116 See HENING, supra 78, at 37; THE SOUTH-CAROLINA JUSTICE OF PEACE, supra note 78, at 20. 
 117 See PARKER, supra note 78, at 28 (“An arrest in the night is good . . . else the party may escape.”); 
accord 1788 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 78, at 26; 1792 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 78, at 
26; DAVIS, supra note 78, at 15; GREENLEAF, supra note 78, at 24; HENING, supra note 32, at 36; LADD, supra 
note 78, at 42; STARKE, supra note 78, at 17. 
 118 See SIMPSON, supra note 78, at 25–27. 
 119 See THE SOUTH-CAROLINA JUSTICE OF PEACE, supra note 78, at 19.  
 120 See 2 HALE, supra note 31, at *150. 
 121 See DAVIS, supra note 78, at 308. 
 122 They stated: 
[L]ord Hale says, it is convenient, that such warrant do require the search to be made in the 
day time; and tho’ I will not affirm (says he) that they are unlawful without such restriction yet 
they are very inconvenient without it; for many times under pretence of searches made in the 
night, robberies and burglaries have been committed, and at best it creates great disturbance. 
But in case not of probable suspicion only, but of positive proof, it is right to execute the 
warrant in the night time, lest the offenders and the goods also be gone before morning. 
PARKER, supra note 78, at 385–86 (emphasis and citation omitted); accord 1788 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, 
supra note 78, at 323–24; GREENLEAF, supra note 78, at 323; THE SOUTH-CAROLINA JUSTICE OF PEACE, supra 
note 78, at 425.  
 123 See 1792 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 78, at 323–24; LADD, supra note 78, at 358. 
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onto Hale’s caution a puzzling addendum, presumably granting authorities 
more wiggle room: “[I]t is better to require the Search to be made in the Day 
Time, unless it be in particular Cases.”124 The 1795 Virginia manual, by 
contrast, did not contain this proviso and instead, like the 1774 North Carolina 
manual, recited Hale’s bare admonition against nocturnal searches.125 Finally, 
the 1761 South Carolina manual simply did not mention nocturnal searches.126 
It is unclear what was meant by “positive proof” or “particular cases.” But 
these exceptions may have meant that different jurisdictions, at different times, 
had different degrees of robustness in their bars on nocturnal searches. 
h. Guilt of the Arrestee as an Absolute Defense 
The manuals also appear to differ over whether the guilt of the arrestee was 
an absolute defense to a subsequent tort action. That is to say, could a factually 
guilty arrestee sue in tort based on an improper arrest? Traditionally, the 
answer was “no,”127 and that traditional rule is suggested in most of the 
manuals: in listing out various grounds for a warrantless arrest, these manuals 
began by categorizing the grounds as “the causes of suspicion, which are 
generally agreed to justify the arrest of an innocent person.”128 This wording 
suggests that arrest of a factually guilty person was always justified. However, 
language in the 1774 Virginia manual implied that even a guilty person could 
sue for trespass if no grounds for arrest existed: it described the acceptable 
grounds for arrest as the “Causes of Suspicion to justify an Arrest.”129 
i. Seizure of Papers via Warrant 
Thirty years after Entick v. Carrington130 was decided, and after it would 
have been known among Americans,131 the 1795 Virginia manual became the 
 
 124 See STARKE, supra note 78, at 351 (emphasis added). 
 125 See HENING, supra note 32, at 402. 
 126 See SIMPSON, supra note 78, at 225–27. 
 127 See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 767 (1994) 
(asserting that, at common law, arrest of an actually guilty person was always lawful); Davies, supra note 5, 
at 631 (“[A]n officer could justify a felony arrest if the arrestee was actually guilty of the felony for which the 
arrest was made . . . .”). 
 128 PARKER, supra note 78, at 26 (emphasis added); accord 1788 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 78, 
at 24; 1792 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 78, at 24; GREENLEAF, supra note 78, at 22; HENING, supra 
note 32, at 33; LADD, supra note 78, at 39; THE SOUTH-CAROLINA JUSTICE OF PEACE, supra note 78, at 17. 
 129 See STARKE, supra note 16, at 16 (emphasis added). 
 130 (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.); 2 Wils. K.B. 275. 
 131 See Donald A. Dripps, “Dearest Property”: Digital Evidence and the History of Private “Papers” as 
Special Objects of Search and Seizure, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 49, 65–66 (2013). 
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first to suggest that seizure of private papers, even via warrant, was illegal. The 
manual extensively discussed Entick for the proposition that “a warrant to seize 
and carry away papers . . . [is] illegal and void.”132 The manual recited the 
holding of Entick with no editorial comment, suggesting, but never saying 
expressly, that the author agreed with that holding.133 By sharp contrast, even 
the other manuals published in the 1790s did not cite Entick or any other case 
for the proposition that search warrants for private papers were illegal.134 One 
might argue that, by failing to mention search warrants for anything other than 
stolen goods, these manuals recognized a common law bar on such warrants. 
However, statutory authority for search warrants for other items, such as 
uncustomed goods, was well accepted during the framing period135 and dates 
back to at least 1660 under English law.136 Rather, it appears, but is by no 
means certain, that the 1795 Virginia manual barred searches and seizures of 
private papers, and that the others either permitted them or took no position. 
2. The Significance of Differences Among the Justice of the Peace Manuals 
The differences across geographic boundaries and over time in the common 
law of search and seizure, as demonstrated by the justice of the peace manuals, 
are all the more striking given that virtually all of these manuals “drew heavily 
on [Richard] Burn’s English manual.”137 Indeed, the very fact that different 
manuals were used in different sections of North America and were 
periodically updated belies any notion that the laws were uniform or static.138 
 
 132 HENING, supra note 32, at 404. 
 133 Thus, Professor Dripps appears to have gone too far when he wrote that Hening “expressly 
prohibit[ed] warrants for papers.” Dripps, supra note 131, at 76. 
 134 See 1792 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 78, at 324; LADD, supra note 78, at 359. Although Ladd 
does cite Entick, he does so only for the proposition that “[g]eneral search warrants are illegal.” Id. at 357. 
Again, Professor Dripps appears to read too much into Ladd’s singular citation of Entick in concluding that 
Ladd meant to forbid searches and seizures of private papers. See Dripps, supra note 131, at 76. 
 135 See infra Part II.B. 
 136 See An Act to Prevent Fraudes and Concealments of His Majestyes Customes and Subsidyes, 1660, 12 
Car. 2, c. 19, § 1. 
 137 Davies, supra note 32, at 73 n.220 (observing that CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, the 1773 Massachusetts 
manual, the 1774 Virginia manual, and the 1788 South Carolina manual all derived from Burn); see also 
Thomas Y. Davies, Can You Handle the Truth?: The Framers Preserved Common-Law Criminal Arrest and 
Search Rules in “Due Process of Law”—“Fourth Amendment Reasonableness” Is Only a Modern, 
Destructive, Judicial Myth, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 51, 64 n.46 (2010) (observing that CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, 
the 1773 Massachusetts manual, the 1788 South Carolina manual, the 1792 New England manual, and the 
1795 Virginia manual all derived from Burn). The only exception from among the works this Article uses is 
the 1774 North Carolina manual. See Davies, supra note 13, at 281 n.122. 
 138 See Conley, supra note 76, at 265 (“[T]he main reason for revised editions rested on an editor’s 
conscientious attempt to maintain the book’s currency . . . .”). 
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Thus, the differences among them appear to be the result of conscious picking 
and choosing of the various aspects of Burn to fit the particular jurisdiction at a 
particular time. One might argue that these manuals cannot show 
search-and-seizure law as it was actually practiced by colonial and early State 
constables and justices of the peace. But that proves too much, for no extant 
source can do this.139 Moreover, differences among the manuals probably 
understate the extent to which practice diverged from policy. For example, 
although all the manuals provide that “hue and cry”—by which offenders were 
pursued and arrested immediately after an offense was committed140—was a 
sufficient ground for arrest, the use of this procedure appears to have varied by 
State and was used rarely in Virginia.141 But these manuals remain “the sources 
regarding criminal procedure that were most accessible to members of the 
Framers’ generation.”142 
One might argue that differences among the different manuals is less the 
result of policy preferences of a particular jurisdiction and more the result of 
either carelessness or an intent to convey the same exact information in slightly 
different forms. But the editors of these manuals were, in most cases, 
experienced lawyers, judges, and justices of the peace.143 Davis was “a 
prominent attorney, member of the council, and a justice of the peace” in North 
Carolina.144 “Greenleaf was . . . a justice of the peace for Plymouth County, 
Massachusetts.”145 Grimké was not only a Cambridge educated lawyer and a 
justice of the peace but was also a judge on the South Carolina superior 
court.146 Hening was an attorney “who served on the Privy Council and as a 
clerk of the Chancery Court” in Virginia.147 Simpson was Chief Justice of 
South Carolina.148 Moreover, their intent of keeping their manuals up to date 
through a process of inclusion and exclusion is manifested, at least in some 
cases, by their prefatory remarks, such as Ladd’s expression of gratitude to 
 
 139 See Davies, supra note 13, at 282 n.124 (“So far as I know, we have no historical sources that preserve 
systematic evidence of practice; hence, it is not possible to demonstrate to what extent framing-era practice 
comported with doctrine.”). 
 140 See 2 HALE, supra note 31, at *98–104. 
 141 See Davies, supra note 137, at 75 n.105. 
 142 See Davies, supra note 13, at 280; see also Conley, supra note 76, at 265 (suggesting that “the 
American justices relied on their manual as their primary source of legal reference”). 
 143 See Conley, supra note 76, at 263 (“[T]he editors . . . in most instances were justices of the 
peace . . . .”). 
 144 Id. at 278. 
 145 Id. at 290 n.94. 
 146 See id. at 280, 293 n.154. 
 147 Id. at 276. 
 148 See id. at 279. 
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“those gentlemen of the profession, who have . . . furnished him with 
alterations which have been made in American Jurisprudence.”149 Thus, it is 
implausible that these legal experts included or omitted material carelessly or 
arbitrarily; rather, these editorial decisions appear to have been deliberately 
made.150 
It could also be argued that simple omissions from one manual should not 
necessarily be interpreted as disagreements with other manuals that contain the 
omitted material, absent an express statement of disagreement. Yet, one would 
naturally expect such disagreements to typically take the form of omissions 
rather than explicit statements of disagreement. For example, in a section 
listing the types of authority to make warrantless arrests, one would not expect 
a manual to expressly state that there is no authority to arrest a night walker or 
vagrant. Instead, one would expect to see exactly what one sees in some of the 
manuals: a failure to mention this authority at all. And as legal experts, the 
editors of these manuals would likely understand the significance of such an 
omission. 
Moreover, the generally light editing that occurred between editions of the 
justice of the peace manuals makes all the more significant the editorial 
choices that were made. For example, the 1764 and 1792 versions of 
Conductor Generalis were virtually identical. Not only that, but the later 
version retained the earlier edition’s references to the king,151 to English 
statutes,152 and to other terms peculiar to English legal culture, such as 
“member[s] of parliament,”153 “peers,”154 and “knights”155—nearly a decade 
after the Treaty of Paris guaranteed a separate legal existence for the United 
States.156 This is suggestive of a strong resistance to change when updating the 
 
 149 LADD, supra note 78, at v–vi. 
 150 See Conley, supra note 76, at 288 n.61 (“Each editor used his own judgment to delete or add 
material.”); see also id. at 269 (“Each editor . . . emphasized different themes or concerns by his decision to 
include or exclude certain material.”). 
 151 1792 CONDUCTOR GENERALIS, supra note 78, at 24–29 (using the terms “the king’s will,” “the king’s 
peace,” “the suit of the king,” “king’s bench,” “forfeiture to the king,” and “the king’s name”).  
 152 Id. at 24, 26 (citing, in turn, An Ordinance of the Forest, 1306, 34 Edw. 1, c. 1; Apprehension of 
Endorsed Warrants Act, 1750, 24 Geo. 2, c. 55; and the Statute of Winchester, 1285, 13 Edw. 1, c. 1–6). 
 153 Id. at 24. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 26. 
 156 See The Definitive Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Between His Britannick Majesty, and the United 
States of America, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. I, Sept. 3, 1783, 2 U.S.T. 151. 
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manual.157 Accordingly, the omission in the 1792 version of the Saunders 
Welch essay justifying search-incident-to-arrest authority158 is highly 
significant. 
In any event, the reason that certain rules were omitted or included in the 
various manuals is far less important than the fact that they were omitted or 
included. The function of these manuals, after all, was to inform 
eighteenth-century justices of the peace and constables, who generally lacked 
any formal legal training, how to do their jobs.159 Assuming that the manuals 
performed this function, we also have to assume that the various omissions and 
inclusions were manifested in the day-to-day practices of justices and 
constables.160 Diligent justices of the peace or constables, in consulting a 
manual to determine whether a vagrant or night walker could be arrested 
without a warrant, would have come to different conclusions based on where 
they were. A risk-averse justice consulting a manual to determine whether he 
could issue a pre-indictment arrest warrant, and a risk-averse constable doing 
the same to determine whether he could break doors to serve such a warrant, 
would have come to different conclusions depending on whether they were in 
Massachusetts in 1773, Virginia in 1774, or South Carolina in 1788. Cautious 
constables in the 1760s might not search incident to arrest except in New 
Jersey, where the applicable manual explicitly gave them that authority. We 
can only assume that the directives of the manuals, or the absence thereof, thus 
became the common law of the jurisdiction through custom and usage. 
Whatever the reasons for the differences in search-and-seizure doctrine, 
search-and-seizure practice, as evidenced by these manuals, differed by colony 
and State, and over time. 
 
 157 See Conley, supra note 76, at 263 (“[E]ven after the Revolution the editors [of CONDUCTOR 
GENERALIS] refused to Americanize the manual.”). 
 158 See supra Part II.A.1.e. 
 159 See Conley, supra note 76, at 265 (observing that the manuals’ editors sought “to provide information 
on topics of law not readily available to the colonists because of the general lack of law books in the 
colonies”); see also id. at 280 (observing that Grimké’s “reasons for publishing [his] work centered around the 
need to assist the local justices in the performance of their duties”); id. at 283 (characterizing the manuals “an 
alternative to legal education”). 
 160 See id. at 263 (“Americans recognized that these justice manuals had a high value, juristic as well as 
practical.” (endnote omitted)); id. at 271 (observing that “the justices of the peace in New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts, and Vermont” expressed their need for the 1792 Ladd manual “by quickly purchasing” it); id. 
at 283 (“The widespread printing and sale of these manuals throughout the colonies indicated a recognition of 
their value by the colonists.”). 
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Concededly, those differences were relatively few and at the margins.161 
Yet, likewise, only the tiniest fraction of DNA makes the difference between a 
human being and a bonobo. Like the building blocks of life, the common law 
is intricate, and its intricacy is founded upon “its ability to comprehend a 
variety of exceptions to a general rule.”162 And as any first-year law student 
knows, learning the law is all about learning when to apply the rule and when 
the exception. That one jurisdiction applies the rule when another applies the 
exception is not a trivial matter. 
Thus, some of the issues on which these manuals differed geographically 
and temporally are closely analogous to Fourth Amendment issues that 
confound and divide modern courts. For example, the issue of whether night 
walkers or vagrants could be arrested without warrant is similar to the issue 
that divided the Court 5–4 in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista: whether the Fourth 
Amendment (as incorporated by the Fourteenth) prohibits a warrantless arrest 
for an offense that could not be punished by incarceration.163 It is also 
analogous to the still-controversial164 1968 decision in Terry v. Ohio,165 
permitting temporary detention upon reasonable suspicion of commission of a 
crime.166 Whether and to what extent the general bar on nocturnal searches 
allowed for an exception when there is “positive proof . . . lest the offenders 
and goods also be gone before morning,”167 is closely analogous to modern 
disagreements over whether and to what extent exigent circumstances can 
justify warrantless intrusions into dwellings168 or the failure of police to knock 
 
 161 See id. at 277 (“Th[e] similarity found in the manuals across colonies and regions is very striking.”); 
Davies, supra note 13, at 282 n.125 (“There were some unsettled points at the margin.”). 
 162 Meyler, supra note 1, at 578. 
 163 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001); see supra Part I.B.2.a. 
 164 See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police 
Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1271 (1998); Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: 
Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383 (1988). 
 165 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 166 See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 381 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (analogizing rule 
announced in Terry to the common-law power to arrest night walkers). But see Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1804 
(“[T]he treatment of night-walkers is weak precedent for Terry stops.”). For an interesting discussion of 
whether the night walker statutes provide support for Terry on originalist grounds, see Lawrence Rosenthal, 
Pragmatism, Originalism, Race, and the Case Against Terry v. Ohio, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 299, 330–33 
(2010). 
 167 GREENLEAF, supra note 78, at 323. 
 168 See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862 (2011) (assuming without deciding that sounds of 
movement in apartment known to contain drugs after knock on door went unanswered gave rise to exigent 
circumstances). 
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and announce their presence.169 Whether and to what extent state officials were 
liable for trespass when they broke doors of a third party’s dwelling to arrest 
someone who turned out not to be present calls to mind the ongoing debate 
over what level of suspicion is required on the part of the police regarding the 
putative arrestee’s presence in order to break doors to make an arrest.170 The 
omission or inclusion of a “common fame of the country” ground for arrest—
that is, permitting arrest on the basis of hearsay and rumor—is redolent of 
modern-day disputes over whether and to what extent hearsay information is 
sufficient to justify an arrest.171 It is with these granular details of how 
search-and-seizure law is operationalized, and not just the sweeping and 
grandiose language of fundamental rights, that modern police officers, lawyers, 
and judges are concerned. 
B. Excise and Customs Searches of Non-Dwelling Premises 
Aside from the differences noted among the various justice of the peace 
manuals, there was at least one other respect, not covered by these manuals, in 
which search-and-seizure law differed by jurisdiction during the framing 
period. At least regarding excise searches, some jurisdictions required warrants 
to enter any premises on land, while others required warrants only to enter 
dwellings. Warrants to search for dutiable and taxable items, unlike warrants to 
search for stolen goods, were a creature of statute, not common law.172 
Accordingly, the former were not mentioned in the common-law-centered 
justice of the peace manuals. Instead, one must look to statutory authority.173 
In Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, dwellings were treated separate and 
apart from all other premises. Those States required that officials obtain 
 
 169 See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997) (holding that reasonable suspicion of exigency is 
sufficient for police to dispense with “knock and announce” requirement). 
 170 See Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and the Fourth Amendment, 
65 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1197 (2012). Compare United States v. Gorman, 314 F.3d 1105, 1111–15 (9th Cir. 
2002) (requiring probable cause to believe defendant on premises), with Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220, 
1224–25 (10th Cir. 1999) (permitting such entry on less than probable cause to believe defendant on 
premises).  
 171 See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 414 (1969) (characterizing the allegation that the 
suspect was generally known “as a bookmaker, an associate of bookmakers, a gambler, and an associate of 
gamblers” as “but a bald and unilluminating assertion of suspicion that is entitled to no weight”). 
 172 See Davies, supra note 5, at 646 (“[T]he absence of . . . common-law authority for search warrants 
other than for stolen property[] explains why Parliament had to enact statutory search authority for customs 
officers.”); id. at 659 n.306 (“Customs search authority was . . . defined by statute in the American states.”). 
 173 It bears repeating that, in looking to the “common law” of 1791, the Court has interpreted that term 
broadly enough to include the statutory landscape as well as case law, commentary, and custom. See supra 
notes 18–19 and accompanying text. 
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warrants in order to enter dwellings to search for smuggled items but did not 
require warrants to enter any other premises.174 A 1780 Pennsylvania statute 
establishing an impost provided that collectors of the impost could, without a 
warrant, “enter any ship or vessel, and into any house or other place where he 
shall have reason to suspect that any goods, wares or merchandise, liable to 
the . . . duty, shall be concealed, and therein to search for the same.”175 
However, the Act made clear that, in order to search a dwelling, a warrant was 
required.176 Likewise, Massachusetts enacted an impost in 1783 that allowed 
collectors of the impost to enter without a warrant “into [a] vessel or float, 
store, building or place (dwelling-houses excepted) and there to search for” 
any goods taken there in violation of the law.177 Again, the Act made clear that 
a warrant was required to search a dwelling.178 
By stark contrast, Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia treated all 
premises on land in the same way they treated dwellings: a warrant was 
required to enter. A 1781 Virginia impost statute required that collectors of the 
impost obtain a warrant to search “any house, warehouse or storehouse.”179 A 
1784 Maryland impost statute required a warrant for entry into “any house, 
warehouse, storehouse or cellar.”180 And a 1784 North Carolina statute was 
identical to Virginia’s in that respect.181 
Although the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment would ultimately 
dictate a national standard regarding the contents of federal search warrants, it 
says nothing explicitly about when warrants are required. In the years leading 
up to the adoption of the Amendment, the States differed starkly over as 
significant an issue as whether warrants were required to search non-dwelling 
premises. This issue “was still unsettled during the ratification debates.”182 
 
 174 See Davies, supra note 5, at 681–83. 
 175 Act of Dec. 23, 1780, ch. 925, § 5, 1780 Pa. Laws 252, 253, available at http://www.palrb.us/ 
statutesatlarge/17001799/1780/0/act/0925.pdf (emphasis added). 
 176 Id.; see Davies, supra note 5, at 682 n.370. 
 177 Act of July 10, 1783, ch. 12, 1783 Mass. Acts 506, 526 available at http://archives.lib.state.ma.us/ 
actsResolves/1783/1783acts0012.pdf (emphasis added). 
 178 Id. at 527. 
 179 Act of Nov. 5, 1781, ch. 40, § 11, 1781 Va. Acts 151; see Davies, supra note 5, at 682 n.374. 
 180 Act of Jan. 22, 1785, ch. 84, § 7, 1784 Md. Laws 438, available at http://msa.maryland.gov/ 
megafile/msa/speccol/sc4800/sc4872/003180/html/m3180-1403.html; see Davies, supra note 5, at 682 n.374. 
 181 See Davies, supra note 5, at 682 n.374 (observing that the North Carolina statute “provided the same 
search authority as that of Virginia”). 
 182 Id. at 706. 
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III. THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS AND THE CONTINGENCY OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
SEARCH-AND-SEIZURE RULES 
As of 1791, the common law of search and seizure was even more 
differentiated than the U.S. Supreme Court’s cases reveal. The question 
remains whether and to what extent that differentiation should be imported into 
our understanding of the Fourth Amendment. On an originalist account, the 
answer depends upon whether and to what extent the framers and ratifiers of 
the Fourth Amendment understood the common law of search and seizure to 
be differentiated rather than uniform, and whether and to what extent they 
understood the Fourth Amendment as incorporating that differentiated 
common law. It is clear that a large segment of those who spoke and wrote 
about the common law, and in particular the Anti-Federalist progenitors of the 
Bill of Rights, understood its differentiated nature. Within a short time, former 
Federalist and principal draftsman of the Bill of Rights, James Madison 
himself, was an adherent of this view. While there is no conclusive evidence 
that the framers and ratifiers of the Fourth Amendment understood it as 
incorporating this differentiated nature, several clues point strongly in that 
direction. 
A. The Anti-Federalist Notion of State Sovereignty as a Guarantor of 
Individual Liberty 
The moderate Anti-Federalists initially opposed the Constitution and later 
demanded that the Bill of Rights be adopted as the price for their reluctant 
acquiescence to ratification. Thus, Anti-Federalist views on the necessity of a 
Bill, grounded in the belief that individual liberty was tied to state norms, is 
critical to a complete understanding of the Bill. 
The Anti-Federalists were opposed to the unamended Constitution because 
the proposed new central government would draw power away from the States, 
leaving them weak and enervated, and this would lead to infringement of the 
rights of their citizens. While we tend to view individual rights as being in 
tension with governmental power, the Anti-Federalists saw things differently. 
They saw local, responsive government as the guardian of liberty.183 The threat 
to freedom came, not from government in general, but from the proposed new 
federal government. The Anti-Federalists viewed the States as the protectors of 
 
 183 See Gerard V. Bradley, The Constitutional Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 817, 
851 (1989) (“Contrary to our impulses, people at that time really believed that responsive electoral 
governments . . . insured liberty.”). 
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individual rights,184 for nearly every State had drafted a constitution since 1776 
guaranteeing its citizens a number of individual rights.185 The greatest fear of 
the Anti-Federalists, spurring them to demand a federal bill of rights, was that 
the state constitutions and bills of rights would be ineffectual to protect the 
citizenry from the new federal government’s exercise of broad new powers. Of 
particular concern were the Necessary and Proper Clause,186 giving an 
open-ended means by which to effectuate the enumerated powers, and the 
Supremacy Clause,187 which explicitly subordinated state norms to federal 
power.188 And because the federal government would be acting directly upon 
the citizenry, state constitutions and bills of rights were no barrier. Preservation 
 
 184 See Robert C. Palmer, Liberties as Constitutional Provisions: 1776–1791, in LIBERTY AND 
COMMUNITY: CONSTITUTION AND RIGHTS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 55, 115 (William E. Nelson & 
Robert C. Palmer eds., 1987) (“[The Anti-Federalists] considered the states protectors, not opponents, of 
rights.”); Harry N. Scheiber, Federalism and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, in AMERICAN 
LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 85, 87 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry 
N. Scheiber eds., 1978) (“The Antifederalists asserted that the splendor of the American nation 
depended . . . on state sovereignty: . . . on the ability of each distinct people within the union to defend its own 
liberties through the instrumentality of government close at hand . . . .”); George C. Thomas III, When 
Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the Framers’ Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. 
L. REV. 145, 180 (2001) (“The anti-Federalists . . . saw state legislatures and state courts as the protectors of 
citizens and not as threats.”); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Original Purpose of the Bill of Rights: James 
Madison and the Founders’ Search for a Workable Balance Between Federal and State Power, 26 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 1261, 1281 (1989) (observing that, according to the Anti-Federalists, “the states . . . were considered 
to be the true guardians of the people’s rights”). 
 185 Eleven of the thirteen States—all but Connecticut and Rhode Island—had drafted new constitutions 
following independence. See Steven G. Calabresi, Sarah E. Agudo & Kathryn L. Dore, State Bills of Rights in 
1787 and 1791: What Individual Rights Are Really Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 
85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1451, 1465 tbl.3 (2012). These constitutions guaranteed anywhere from 9 (in South 
Carolina) to 50 (in New Hampshire) individual rights, with a median of 35 (in Delaware). Id. 
 186 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o make all Laws which shall 
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers . . . .”). 
 187 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made 
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 188 See THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE: ANTIFEDERALISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 81 (Alpheus Thomas 
Mason ed., 2d ed. 1972) (“The combined effect of the supremacy clause and the necessary-and-proper clause 
seemed especially dangerous to the rights of the states and their citizens.”); Scheiber, supra note 184, at 90 
(“The means for . . . oppression were ready at hand in the Constitution: its supremacy clause would support 
nearly any attack on state sovereignty; [and] the necessary-and-proper and general-welfare clauses comprised 
practically unlimited writs of authority . . . .”); Herbert J. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For, in 
1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 3, 28 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (“The broad grants of power, taken 
together with the ‘supremacy’ and ‘necessary and proper’ clauses, amounted, the Anti-Federalists contended, 
to an unlimited grant of power to the general government to do whatever it might choose to do.”). 
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of individual freedom was thus inextricably linked to the preservation of state 
power; states’ rights and individual rights were intertwined.189 
George Mason summed up these concerns in the very first sentence of his 
Objections to the Constitution of Government Formed by the Convention.190 
Mason, who attended the Constitutional Convention but refused to sign the 
Constitution,191 published his Objections before the ink was dry on the 
Constitution, and his Objections became “the first salvo in the paper war over 
ratification.”192 Mason’s Objections were second only to those of Elbridge 
Gerry193 in their significance and influence among other Anti-Federalists.194 
Mason began his Objections this way: “There is no Declaration of Rights; and 
the Laws of the general Government being paramount to the Laws and 
Constitutions of the several States, the Declaration of Rights in the separate 
States are no Security.”195 Thus, Mason’s very first reason for opposing the 
Constitution was that, because the Supremacy Clause subordinated state bills 
of rights, these were “no [s]ecurity” against the federal government. 
The concern that the Constitution would weaken state governments and 
emasculate their bills of rights to the detriment of individual liberty was 
 
 189 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 128 (1998) (“[The] point 
is not that substantive rights are unimportant, but that these rights were intimately intertwined with structural 
considerations.”); SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING 
TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788–1828, at 6 (1999) (“Cast in modern terms, states’ rights and individual rights 
were not antithetical in Anti-Federalist constitutionalism, but intimately bound together.”); Murray Dry, The 
Case Against Ratification: Anti-Federalist Constitutional Thought, in THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 271, 275 (Leonard W. Levy & Dennis J. Mahoney eds., 1987) (“[T]he Anti-Federal 
interest in rights goes together with an interest in mild, and hence decentralized, government.”); Michael 
Lienesch, North Carolina: Preserving Rights, in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION 343, 355 (Michael Allen 
Gillespie & Michael Lienesch eds., 1989) (“For them, the rights of the people were inseparable from the rights 
of their states.”); Palmer, supra note 184, at 108 (“Preservation of state authority and liberty restrictions on the 
federal government can never be distinct; the individuals who would benefit most from individual rights 
preserved against the federal government were those who were supporting a state government’s policy at odds 
with federal policy.”); THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE, supra note 188, at 98 (“Spurring the Antifederalist 
campaign was the unshakeable conviction that the proposed Constitution would enthrone a consolidated 
government, thereby rendering state protection of individual rights insecure.”). 
 190 George Mason, Objections to the Constitution of Government Formed by the Convention (1787), 
reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 188, at 11. 
 191 See Herbert J. Storing, Commentary to George Mason’s Objections to the Constitution of Government 
Formed by the Convention, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 188, at 9. 
 192 Robert A. Rutland, Framing and Ratifying the First Ten Amendments, in THE FRAMING AND 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 189, at 305, 305. 
 193 Letter from Elbridge Gerry to Samuel Adams & James Warren (Oct. 18, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE 
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 188, at 6, 6–8. 
 194 CORNELL, supra note 189, at 29. 
 195 Mason, supra note 190, at 13. 
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echoed by Anti-Federalists in state ratifying conventions and political tracts up 
and down the continent. At the Pennsylvania convention, Robert Whitehill said 
that the Constitution would be “the means of annihilating the constitutions of 
the several States, and consequently the liberties of the people” and that “the 
dissolution of our State constitutions will produce the ruin of civil liberty.”196 
In one widely read tract, Pennsylvania Anti-Federalist Centinel (George or 
Samuel Bryan)197 echoed these sentiments, writing that “the general 
government would necessarily annihilate the particular [i.e., state] 
governments, and . . . the security of the personal rights of the people by the 
state constitutions [would be] superseded and destroyed.”198 Similarly, in the 
Virginia ratifying convention the following June, Patrick Henry declared that 
the Constitution would “annihilate[]” the state government, leaving it 
powerless, and thereby render the state bill of rights a barrier only against a 
“weakened, prostrated, enervated State Government,” and therefore a 
nullity.199 Likewise, at the New York ratifying convention, Thomas Tredwell 
expressly tied the loss of state power to the loss of individual liberty when he 
lamented: “Here we find no security for the rights of individuals, no security 
for the existence of our state governments; here is no bill of rights, no proper 
restriction of power; our lives, our property, and our consciences, are left 
wholly at the mercy of the [national] legislature.”200 
The Federalist response to this position is telling as well. The Federalists 
initially opposed adding a bill of rights for two related reasons: first, that it was 
unnecessary, and second, that it was dangerous. A bill of rights, they 
maintained, was unnecessary because the powers of the federal government 
 
 196 PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1787–1788, at 287 (John Bach McMaster & 
Frederick D. Stone eds., Lancaster, Inquirer Printing & Publ’g Co. 1888); see also Palmer, supra note 184, at 
109 (recounting fear of a minority of the Pennsylvania ratifying convention “that the federal government 
would absorb the states, and that the federal Constitution would supersede completely the rights specifications 
in state constitutions”). 
 197 See JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION 1781–1788, at 
287 app. C (3d prtg. 1961). 
 198 Letter of Centinel (Oct. 24, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 188, at 
143, 152. This letter was among the most widely circulated Anti-Federalist tracts, having been reprinted eleven 
times during the ratification period. See CORNELL, supra note 189, at 46. 
 199 Patrick Henry, Speech in the Virginia State Ratifying Convention (June 16, 1788), reprinted in 5 THE 
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 188, at 246, 247. Henry on several other occasions expressed the 
intertwined nature of individual liberty and state sovereignty. See Palmer, supra note 184, at 111–12. 
 200 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 401 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1876) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES]. Similar comments were made at the New York convention by Melancton Smith and John Lansing. 
See Palmer, supra note 184, at 113–14. 
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were limited and enumerated;201 the Constitution would give it no power, for 
example, to authorize general warrants because that was not one of the powers 
vested by Article I. They also maintained that listing certain rights would be 
dangerous to liberty because such an enumeration would imply the 
nonexistence of any other rights.202 
But embedded in their first argument was a sub-argument regarding the 
effectiveness of state constitutions and bills of rights. To the extent that the 
federal government did overextend its powers, they asserted, the state 
constitutions and bills of rights would act as a buffer between the government 
and the people, even absent a federal bill. For example, when the issue first 
arose at the Constitutional Convention on September 12, 1787, Roger Sherman 
brushed aside the suggestion that a federal bill was needed, arguing:  “The 
State Declarations of Rights are not repealed by this Constitution; and being in 
force are sufficient.”203 That is to say, Sherman believed that the state 
constitutions and bills of rights would operate even against the federal 
government to preserve individual liberty. 
This belief was echoed by Edmund Randolph at the Virginia ratifying 
convention the following year. Speaking specifically about the supposed 
necessity of a provision barring general warrants, he stated: 
That general warrants are grievous and oppressive, and ought not be 
granted, I fully admit. . . . But we have sufficient security here . . . . 
Can it be believed that the federal judiciary would not be independent 
enough to prevent such oppressive practices? If they will not do 
justice to persons injured, may they not go to our own state 
judiciaries, and obtain it?204 
Thus, Randolph believed that the general common-law bar on general warrants 
would be sufficient, even absent a written bill of rights, to require federal 
judges to disallow them. And, if that were not enough, state judges, 
presumably also relying upon general common law, would do so. 
 
 201 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 512 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (“[A] minute 
detail of particular rights is certainly far less applicable to a Constitution like that under consideration, which is 
merely intended to regulate the general political interests of the nation, than to a constitution which has the 
regulation of every species of personal and private concerns.”). 
 202 See id. at 513 (“I go further and affirm that bills of rights . . . are not only unnecessary in the proposed 
Constitution but would even be dangerous. They would . . . afford a colorable pretext to claim more [powers] 
than were granted. For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do?”); see also 
THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE, supra note 188, at 83. 
 203 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 588 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
 204 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 200, at 468 (emphasis added). 
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But the Anti-Federalists were not convinced. They wanted to make explicit 
what Federalists Sherman and Randolph believed was implicit in the 
Constitution. For example, Anti-Federalist Agrippa (James Winthrop of 
Massachusetts),205 as part of a proposed set of amendments to the document, 
suggested that the Constitution expressly say that state bills of rights stand as a 
barrier between the federal government and the individual: 
Nothing in this constitution shall deprive a citizen of any state of the 
benefit of the bill of rights established by the constitution of the state 
in which he shall reside, and such bills of rights shall be considered 
as valid in any court of the United States where they shall be 
pleaded.206 
In a similar vein, an amendment proposed by Melancton Smith at the New 
York ratifying convention would have required all federal officers “to be 
bound, by oath or affirmation, not to infringe the constitutions or rights of the 
respective states.”207 This amendment was adopted by the New York ratifying 
convention in a set of amendments proposed to Congress as part and parcel of 
the State’s ratification.208 
Ultimately, ratification failed on the initial ballot in Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, and Virginia.209 This failure stemmed 
in large part from the Anti-Federalists’ belief that, without an explicit 
provision such as Agrippa’s or Smith’s proposed amendment, state 
constitutions and bills of rights were no protection against the proposed federal 
government. And the reason for that position has much to do with two very 
distinct views of the common law entertained respectively by the Federalists 
and Anti-Federalists. 
B. The Anti-Federalist Conception of Common Law 
It makes some sense to view the Fourth Amendment as constitutionalizing 
common-law restrictions on search-and-seizure authority. The founding 
“generation was steeped in both the rules and the rhetoric of the common 
 
 205 See CORNELL, supra note 189, at 53, 58. 
 206 Letter from Agrippa to the Massachusetts Convention (Feb. 5, 1788), reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL 
ANTI-FEDERALIST 54, 57 (W.B. Allen & Gordon Lloyd eds., 2d ed. 2002). 
 207 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 200, at 409–10. 
 208 See 1 id. at 331. 
 209 Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Cruel and Unusual Federal Punishments, 98 IOWA L. REV. 69, 108 
(2012). 
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law.”210 To support their arguments against British rule, the colonists turned 
time and again to the rhetoric of the common-law rights of Englishmen.211 So, 
too, did the Anti-Federalists extol the common law as establishing their rights. 
For example, immediately after asserting that state bills of rights were “no 
[s]ecurity” against the proposed federal government, George Mason in his 
Objections expressly invoked the common law: “Nor are the people secured 
even in the Enjoyment of the Benefits of the common-Law.”212 
But the “common law” in 1791 was a notoriously slippery notion.213 
Conventional wisdom maintains that a pre-Realist view of the common law 
was dominant in the eighteenth century. For example, Justice Scalia has 
written that, at the founding, 
the prevailing image of the common law was that of a preexisting 
body of rules, uniform throughout the nation (rather than different 
from state to state), that judges merely “discovered” rather than 
created. It is only in th[e] [twentieth] century, with the rise of legal 
realism, that we came to acknowledge that judges in fact “make” the 
common law, and that each state has its own.214 
Yet the conventional wisdom glosses over the existence of a competing view 
of the common law at the time of the founding, for there was a distinct 
ideological split in the way the common law was viewed. 
The pre-Realist view described by Justice Scalia was, as he put it, 
“prevailing” only if one looks solely to the Federalists. The Federalists of the 
1790s generally viewed common law as deriving from higher law, the law of 
nature.215 As such, they viewed the common law, and common-law rights in 
particular, not as transient but as fixed, existing “in the air” rather than being 
 
 210 Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1776.  
 211 See Davies, supra note 5, at 670 (“[T]he ideological justification for the American Revolution 
consisted largely of complaints that Parliament’s enactments had encroached upon the ‘immemorial’ 
common-law rights, privileges, and immunities that colonists claimed as English ‘freemen.’”); Sklansky, supra 
note 1, at 1776 (“[T]he colonists regularly used the language of the common law to support their claims 
against Great Britain.”). 
 212 Mason, supra note 188, at 11.  
 213 See Meyler, supra note 1, at 567 (“The very definition and scope of the common law—including its 
permeability to statutory innovation, its longevity, its potential for local variations, and its relation to the 
‘ancient constitution’ securing the rights of the people—were subject to serious contestation.”). 
 214 Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal 
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW 3, 10 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 215 See Andrew Lenner, A Tale of Two Constitutions: Nationalism in the Federalist Era, 40 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 72, 77–88 (1996). 
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tied to sovereignty.216 The remarks of Edmund Randolph regarding the lack of 
necessity of a federal bill of rights are indicative of the general Federalist 
position on the common law. The notion that common-law rights simply exist, 
rather than representing the relationship between an individual and a particular 
sovereign, explains Randolph’s remark that federal and state judges, 
presumably applying general common law, would disallow general warrants, 
even without an express prohibition at the federal level. 
But imputing this view of the common law to the entire founding 
generation is a grave error. By the late eighteenth century, there were sharp 
disputes over the nature of the common law,217 and a proto-Realist view of the 
law had seeped into the American understanding of the nature of law.218 
Specifically, this proto-Realist view was embraced by the Anti-Federalists. 
While their mission was to secure as against the federal government the 
common-law rights of Englishmen, the Anti-Federalists were under no illusion 
that the common law was the same in the United States as it was in England, or 
that it was the same in every State. 
Once again, George Mason summed up the Anti-Federalists’ proto-Realist 
stance in the first paragraph of his Objections. Immediately after invoking the 
common law rights of Englishmen, he wrote that “the common-Law . . . stands 
here upon no other Foundation than [its] having been adopted by the 
respective Acts forming the Constitutions of the several States.”219 That is to 
say, even the common law, that great source of English liberty, has no 
authority unless adopted as the positive law of the polity: it has “no other 
[f]oundation.”220 
 
 216 See Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Response, On Proportionality and Federalism: A Response to 
Professor Stinneford, 97 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 51, 59 (2011) (describing this view as conceiving of the 
common law as “declaratory rather than instrumental, unitary rather than particularized, free floating rather 
than tied to sovereignty”). 
 217 See Mannheimer, supra note 209, at 110–11; see also Meyler, supra note 1, at 567 (“[C]ontroversies 
about the nature of the common law in America undermine any attempt to represent it as a fixed and unified 
entity . . . .”). 
 218 See Meyler, supra note 1, at 557 (“A certain self-consciousness . . . characterized common law 
jurisprudence of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a self-consciousness that undermines the 
view . . . that we became aware only with the legal realists that judges made rather than discovered law.”); 
Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1788 (observing that the acknowledgement that common-law judges made law 
“began in the 1780s and was well underway in the 1790s”). 
 219 Mason, supra note 188, at 11 (emphasis added). 
 220 See THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE, supra note 188, at 89 (observing that Anti-Federalists believed that 
“common law rights stood on no higher law foundation”). 
MANNHEIMER PROOFS2 5/7/2015  10:43 AM 
2015] THE CONTINGENT FOURTH AMENDMENT 1271 
In other Anti-Federalist writings about the need for a bill of rights, the idea 
that the common law had no effect until adopted was often expressed alongside 
the cognate idea that there were as many different versions of the common law 
as there were common-law jurisdictions. For example, “A Maryland Farmer” 
(believed to have been Maryland delegate John Francis Mercer) explicitly 
noted that even the common-law rights of Englishmen are inapplicable unless 
they have been adopted as part of the positive law. And, he recognized, they 
differed from State to State. He wrote: 
If a citizen of Maryland can have no benefit of his own bill of rights 
in the confederal courts, and there is no bill of rights of the United 
States . . . [h]ow could he take advantage of any of the common law 
rights, which have heretofore been considered as the birthright of 
Englishmen and their descendants, could he plead them and produce 
the authority of the English judges in his support? Unquestionably 
not, for the authority of the common law arises from the express 
adoption by the several States in their respective constitutions, and 
that in various degrees and under different modifications.221 
Here we have a frank recognition that common-law rights have no authority 
whatsoever in the courts aside from their “express adoption by the several 
States.” This is followed quickly by the observation that the common law 
exists “in various degrees and under different modifications” in every State. 
Just as telling was the Federalist response: echoing Sherman and Randolph, 
Federalist writer Aristides (Alexander Contee Hanson) asserted that “the party 
injured [by a general warrant] will most clearly have redress in a state 
court.”222 
Soon after ratification, this notion of a differentiated rather than uniform 
common law achieved dominance. Former Anti-Federalist Justice Samuel 
Chase’s polemic against a federal criminal common law in 1798 in 
United States v. Worrall223—a view validated by the full Supreme Court 
fourteen years later in United States v. Hudson224—set the tone.225 The banner 
 
 221 Essay by A [Maryland] Farmer No. I (Feb. 15, 1788), reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE 
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 188, at 13 (emphasis added). 
 222 Herbert J. Storing, Commentary to Essays by A Farmer, 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra 
note 188, at 70 n.8 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 223 28 F. Cas. 774, 779 (C.C.D. Pa. 1798) (No. 16,766). 
 224 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33 (1812); see also TRIAL OF WILLIAM BUTLER FOR PIRACY 25 (Charleston, R. 
Crush 1813) (observing “[t]he many and radical discrepancies which exist among the States as to the 
principles of the Common Law”). 
 225 See Mannheimer, supra note 209, at 116–17. Although appointed to the bench by President 
Washington, Chase had been “a strident Antifederalist who had opposed ratifying the Constitution.” Stewart 
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of states’ rights, and of a differentiated common law, was then picked up by 
the immediate intellectual descendants of the Anti-Federalists, the Jeffersonian 
Republicans,226 in their opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts.227 
Indeed, none other than former Federalist James Madison eloquently set 
forth the Republican position on a differentiated common law less than a 
decade after having successfully secured ratification of the Bill of Rights. In 
his 1800 follow-up to the Virginia Resolutions on the Alien and Sedition Acts, 
Madison wrote: 
 In the state prior to the Revolution, it is certain that the common 
law, under different limitations, made a part of the colonial codes. 
But . . . it was the separate law of each colony within its respective 
limits, and was unknown to them, as a law pervading and operating 
through the whole, as one society. 
 It could not possibly be otherwise. The common law was not the 
same in any two of the colonies; in some the modifications were 
materially and extensively different.228 
Soon after, in the election of 1800, the Federalists, and their view of common 
law as natural law, were roundly defeated.229 The Jeffersonian Republicans, 
with their proto-Realist view of common law, attained political hegemony for 
more than a quarter century afterwards.230 
 
Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law (pt. 1), 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1068 (1985); see Samuel Chase, Notes 
of Speeches Delivered to the Maryland Ratifying Convention (Apr. 1788), reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE 
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 188, at 79–91 (arguing against ratification of the proposed Constitution); see 
also Stephen B. Presser, A Tale of Two Judges: Richard Peters, Samuel Chase, and the Broken Promise of 
Federalist Jurisprudence, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 26, 73 (1978) (characterizing Chase as a “vehement opponent of 
the proposed Federal Constitution on the grounds that it too tightly constricted the sovereignty of the 
individual states”). 
 226 See CORNELL, supra note 189, at 147–218; see also Richard E. Ellis, The Persistence of Federalism 
After 1789, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 
295, 300–14 (Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein & Edward C. Carter II eds., 1987) (observing that “most 
Antifederalists became Republicans” and recounting how the Anti-Federalist emphasis on states’ rights 
manifested itself in Republican thought through the 1830s); John H. Aldrich & Ruth W. Grant, The 
Antifederalists, the First Congress, and the First Parties, 55 J. POL. 295, 298 (1993) (“The ideology of the 
Jeffersonian Republicans . . . bears a striking resemblance to antifederalist thought.”). 
 227 See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2137 (1798) (statement of Rep. Gallatin) (“The common law of Great Britain 
received in each colony, had in every one received modifications arising from their situation; those 
modifications differed in the several States; and now each State had a common law, in its general principles 
the same, but in many particulars differing from each other.”). 
 228 Mr. Madison’s Report on the Virginia Resolutions, reprinted in THE VIRGINIA AND KENTUCKY 
RESOLUTIONS OF 1798 AND ‘99, at 21, 31 (Washington, Jonathan Elliot 1832). 
 229 Lenner, supra note 215, at 105. 
 230 Id. at 75. 
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Implicit in this idea of a differentiated common law is that the common law 
can change over time as a well as across boundaries. Because the 
Anti-Federalists, and later the Republicans, recognized that the common law of 
England was adopted in each colony and State only insofar as it cohered with 
local conditions, they also recognized that the common law is capable of 
changing with those conditions. “By 1791 . . . ‘a commonly understood 
concept of common-law had become that of a process characterized by 
occasional flexibility and capacity for growth in order to respond to changing 
social pressures, rather than that of a fixed and immutable body of unchanging 
rules.’”231 Common law, to them, was neither given from on high nor the 
perfection of pure reason. It was positive law to be adopted, amended, adapted, 
or abrogated, just like statutory law.232 
Thus, we see the nub of the Anti-Federalist’s complaint about the 
unamended Constitution. As Mason argued in his Objections, the common-law 
rights of Englishmen “stand[] . . . upon no other Foundation than [their] having 
been adopted” as the positive law in “the Constitutions of the several 
States.”233 Common-law rights have no separate existence independent of the 
body of the rest of the common law, and the body of the common law exists 
“in various degrees and under different modifications” in the different 
States.234 There was no common law of the United States as a whole and thus 
no common-law rights to restrain the proposed central government. What the 
Anti-Federalists sought, it appears, was the application of common-law rights, 
as adopted by the respective States, to that government. Statements made by 
 
 231 Sklansky, supra note 1, at 1788 (quoting Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the 
Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 736 (1973) (some internal quotation marks omitted)). Professor 
Davies accordingly errs in premising his view of the Fourth Amendment on the assertion “that the basic 
features of common-law criminal procedure were essentially fixed.” Davies, supra note 5, at 672 (emphasis 
omitted). In order to demonstrate the view of the common law taken by the Framers, he quotes a passage by 
Connecticut jurist Jesse Root, who described the common law as “the perfection of reason,” “universal,” “clear 
and certain,” and “immutable.” Id. at 672 n.338 (quoting Jesse Root, Introduction to 1 REPORTS OF CASES 
ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT AND SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS ix (Hartford, Hudson & Goodwin 
1798)). Tellingly, Root was a Federalist. See WESLEY W. HORTON, THE CONNECTICUT STATE CONSTITUTION 
15 (2d ed. 2012). And by 1798, the year of his essay, the battle lines were clearly drawn between Federalists 
and Republicans over their views of the common law. Indeed, at Connecticut’s constitutional convention in 
1818, Root took the position that no bill of rights was necessary, essentially repeating the Federalist party line 
from thirty years earlier. See id. at 16. 
 232 TRIAL OF WILLIAM BUTLER FOR PIRACY, supra note 224, at 24 (“[T]he adoption of the Common Law, 
depended upon the voluntary act of the legislative power of the several States, as much as the passage of any 
positive law.”). 
 233 Mason, supra note 190, at 11. 
 234 Essay by A [Maryland] Farmer No. I, supra note 221, at 13. 
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the Anti-Federalists regarding federal search-and-seizure authority bear this 
out. 
C. The Anti-Federalist Push for Constraints on Federal Search-and-Seizure 
Authority 
During the ratification period, Anti-Federalists specifically criticized the 
proposed Constitution both for its lack of a prohibition of warrants that were 
too general or otherwise promiscuous235 and for its failure to address searches 
and seizures more generally.236 Their objections reveal that what the 
Anti-Federalists sought were not necessarily uniform and unchanging rules on 
the extent to which the federal government could search and seize. Rather, 
their goal appears to have been procedural rather than substantive: to maintain 
the primacy of state search-and-seizure law vis-à-vis federal officials. 
Recall, for example, A Maryland Farmer’s observation that “the authority 
of the common law arises from the express adoption by the several States in 
their respective constitutions, and that in various degrees and under different 
modifications.”237 Importantly, he almost immediately gave as an example the 
absence from the proposed Constitution of a ban on general warrants: “To 
render this more intelligible—suppose for instance, that an officer of the 
United States should force the house . . . of a citizen, by virtue of a general 
warrant, I would ask, are general warrants illegal by the constitution of the 
United States?”238 Read in light of Maryland’s constitutional prohibition on 
general warrants, and his “various degrees and . . . different modifications” 
language, A Maryland Farmer’s concern appears to be not so much with 
 
 235 See, e.g., Letter from the Federal Farmer (Oct. 12, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE 
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 188, at 245, 249 (identifying as among “the rights of freemen . . . freedom from 
hasty and unreasonable search warrants, warrants not founded on oath, and not issued with due caution, for 
searching and seizing men’s papers, property, and persons”); see also Clancy, supra note 67, at 1040 (“[A] 
significant focus was . . . on general warrants.”). 
 236 As Professor William Cuddihy put it, 
the debate of 1787–88 had a wider focus [than just general warrants]. The general warrant was no 
longer the only kind of unreasonable search. The ratifying conventions and pamphleteers 
increasingly spoke in the plural, of unreasonable searches and seizures. General excise searches 
and search warrants issued groundlessly were condemned almost as much as the general warrant. 
WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING, 602–1791, at 690 (2009); 
see also Clancy, supra note 67, at 1032 (“Some have claimed that the commentary addressed solely a concern 
with general warrants. The historical record, however, does not support that view.” (footnote omitted)). 
 237 Essay by A [Maryland] Farmer No. I, supra note 221, at 13. 
 238 Id. at 13–14. 
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imposing a universal ban of general warrants but rather with requiring federal 
officers to respect Maryland law.239 
Patrick Henry in the Virginia ratifying convention made a similar point 
about the potential inability of federal judges to rein in federal officers. And he 
specifically pointed to the fact that state constitutions and bills of rights would 
be ineffectual in holding federal excisemen to account for their actions in 
searching for untaxed goods. He warned that if an aggrieved person were to go 
to the federal courts in “Philadelphia or New York . . . there [he] must appeal 
to judges sworn to support this Constitution, in opposition to that of any 
state.”240 Thus, Henry argued, consistently with the Anti-Federalist party line, 
that adoption of the Constitution without a bill of rights would free federal 
officers from any constitutional constraint on searching and seizing that would 
otherwise exist under state law. Henry consequently despaired that nothing 
would “tie [the] hands” of federal agents who came to search and seize.241 
Henry’s complaint was more procedural than substantive: he sought to control 
federal officers’ search-and-seizure authority through restrictions based on 
state constitutional common law, not by any universal rules. 
Consider also the warnings that Massachusetts Anti-Federalist John DeWitt 
issued about the authority that Congress would give to federal tax collectors 
under the proposed Constitution: 
They are to determine, and you are to make no laws inconsistent with 
such determination, whether such Collectors shall carry with them 
any paper, purporting their commission, or not—whether it shall be a 
general warrant, or a special one—whether written or printed—
whether any of your goods, or your persons shall be exempt from 
distress, and in what manner either you or your property is to be 
treated when taken in consequence of such warrants. They will have 
the liberty of entering your houses by night as well as by day for such 
purposes.242 
DeWitt’s admonition was aimed not simply at the prospect of Congress’ 
formulating search-and-seizure policy that would be antithetical to general 
 
 239 Of course, the Fourth Amendment ultimately did ban general warrants across the board. But this does 
not take away from the fact that the focus of A Maryland Farmer’s pre-ratification concern was not the 
absence of such a uniform rule but the potential conflict between the Maryland rule forbidding general 
warrants and a federal rule permitting them. 
 240 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 200, at 58 (emphasis added). 
 241 Id. at 57. 
 242 John DeWitt, Essay to the Free Citizens of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts No. IV (Dec. 1787), 
reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 188, at 29, 33 (emphasis added). 
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common-law principles. Rather, he cautioned his fellow Bay Staters that they 
would be unable, via the typical routes of judicial and legislative rulemaking, 
to require federal officials to follow Massachusetts law: “you are to make no 
laws inconsistent with [Congress’s] determination.” 
Another variation on this theme is seen in Anti-Federalist Federal Farmer’s 
explicitly linking a demand for limitations on federal search-and-seizure 
authority with an invocation of Magna Carta’s “law of the land” provision.243 
In suggesting various amendments to the Constitution, he proposed 
that all persons shall have a right to be secure from all unreasonable 
searches and seizures of their persons, houses, papers, or possessions; 
and that all warrants shall be deemed contrary to this right, if the 
foundation of them be not previously supported by oath, and there be 
not in them a special designation of persons or objects of search, 
arrest, or seizure: and that no person shall be exiled or molested in 
his person or effects, otherwise than by the judgment of his peers, or 
according to the law of the land.244 
Thus, Federal Farmer specifically conjoined the requirements of a specific 
warrant, supported by oath, with the common-law constraint, stemming from 
Chapter 29 of Magna Carta, that no person be deprived of liberty or property 
other than “according to the law of the land.” 
Consistent with the strain of framing-era thought that posited that the 
common law was jurisdiction specific, there is significant evidence that, by 
“the law of the land,” Federal Farmer was referring not to general or natural 
law but to the law of particular States. For one thing, although his identity is 
 
 243 Coke explained this provision as follows: 
That no man be taken or imprisoned, . . . . be disseised . . . of his freehold (that is) lands, or 
livelihood, or his liberties, or free customs, . . . . be out lawed . . . be exiled . . . . be in any [way] 
destroyed . . . nor condemned . . . but by the judgment of his Peers, that is, equals, or according to 
the Law of the Land. 
EDW. COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND 46 (London, M. Flesher & R. 
Young 1642). Although the “law of the land” clause is sometimes rendered as chapter 39, Coke numbered it 
chapter 29, and that is how it was referred to in framing-era sources. See Davies, supra note 32, at 45 n.108. 
This Article follows that convention. 
 244 Letter from the Federal Farmer (Jan. 20, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, 
supra note 188, at 323, 328 (emphasis added); see Davies, supra note 32, at 101 (observing that Federal 
Farmer combined a proposed ban on general warrants and a proposed requirement that arrests follow “the law 
of the land”). The Federal Farmer’s essays have been described as “[t]he best known of the Antifederalist 
pamphlets,” “[a]mong the most important writings published by Antifederalists in the contest over 
ratification,” and “a key resource for the Constitution’s opponents.” Robert H. Webking, Melancton Smith and 
the Letters from the Federal Farmer, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 510, 510 (1987). 
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still unclear, Federal Farmer is now believed to have been Melancton Smith of 
New York.245 And, as previously noted, Smith proposed an amendment that 
would have expressly required that federal officers “be bound, by oath or 
affirmation, not to infringe the constitutions or rights of the respective 
states.”246 Such an amendment would have done expressly what the Fourth 
Amendment can be read as doing by implication: holding federal officers to 
the different search-and-seizure standards enshrined in the constitution of each 
“respective” State. 
Additionally, “law of the land” provisions in early colonial and state 
legislation generally referred to the law of a specific jurisdiction.247 At least 
seven colonies were home to iterations of Chapter 29 that referred specifically 
to the laws of those jurisdictions,248 “suggest[ing] that the law-of-the-land 
formulation from Magna Carta was viewed in the American colonies in the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries as equivalent to established law 
(either statute or customary).”249 Chapter 29 was thus widely viewed in the 
colonies as requiring only that local positive law be followed in arresting and 
securing people for trial.250 And references in several post-1776 state 
constitutions to the “law of the land” “suggest a continued equivalence, at least 
for some purposes, between the ‘law of the land’ and the positive law of the 
state.”251 
 
 245 See Webking, supra note 244, at 511; Gordon S. Wood, The Authorship of the Letters from the Federal 
Farmer, 31 WM. & MARY Q. 299 (1974). But see David E. Narrett, A Zeal for Liberty: The Antifederalist Case 
Against the Constitution in New York, 69 N.Y. HIST. 285, 291 n.9 (1988) (expressing skepticism that Smith 
was “Federal Farmer”). 
 246 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 200, at 409–10 (emphasis added). 
 247 See Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 435 
(2010) (“For the most part, these enactments . . . paraphrased ‘law of the land’ to refer specifically to the duly 
enacted law of the colony itself.”). 
 248 See, e.g., THE BODY OF LIBERTIES OF 1641, reprinted in THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 33 
(Boston, William H. Whitmore 1889) (“expresse law of the Country”); THE CHARTER OF LIBERTIES AND 
PRIVILEGES GRANTED BY HIS ROYALL HIGHNESSE TO THE INHABITANTS OF NEW YORKE AND ITS 
DEPENDENCYES (Oct. 30, 1683), reprinted in 1 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK: YEAR 1664 TO THE 
REVOLUTION 111, 113 (Albany, James B. Lyon 1894) (“the Law of this province”); AN ACT DECLARING WHAT 
ARE THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEDGES, OF HIS MAJESTY’S SUBJECTS, INHABITING WITHIN THIS PROVINCE OF EAST 
NEW JERSEY (1698), reprinted in AARON LEAMING & JACOB SPICER, THE GRANTS, CONCESSIONS, AND 
ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONS OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW JERSEY 368, 371 (Philadelphia, W. Bradford, 1881) 
(same); Act of Nov. 27, 1700, ch. 19, § 1, 1700 Pa. Stat. 18, (“the laws of this province and territories 
thereof”).  
 249 Williams, supra note 247, at 436. 
 250 See id. at 436–37 (asserting “‘that law of the land’ was understood under seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century English law in a primarily positivist manner”). 
 251 Id. at 439. 
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And Professor Davies has argued persuasively that it was not the Fourth 
Amendment at all but rather the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause252 that 
was understood as incorporating Chapter 29 of Magna Carta and encompassing 
restrictions on federal searches and seizures beyond the requirements of the 
Warrant Clause.253 Accordingly, Federal Farmer’s proposal of a proto-Fourth 
Amendment, linked to a reiteration of Magna Carta’s “law of the land” 
provision, is highly significant. If a widely understood meaning of “law of the 
land” was, in effect, the “law of the State,” then his proposal effectively meant 
and would have been understood as meaning that no one could be searched and 
seized other than by the law of the State where the search or seizure occurred. 
D. The Anti-Federalist Origins of the Bill of Rights 
It is significant that the battle over ratification resulted in the adoption of 
some common-law rights as the Bill of Rights. For if, at least for the 
Anti-Federalists, these common-law rights had no existence separate and apart 
from their adoption in the States, and if the common law differs in every State 
and can change over time, then it follows that the common-law rights adopted 
as the federal Bill of Rights also might vary by State and over time. True, the 
Anti-Federalists lost the ratification battle. But “we distort history when we 
ignore the losers in a conflict, because losing movements are forces which at 
every moment have influenced the final outcome.”254 Given the Bill of Rights’ 
status as the product of the bargained-for exchange between the Federalists and 
the Anti-Federalists, it is appropriate to interpret it as the Anti-Federalist 
essays and speeches suggest they did. 
The Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution as an implicit condition 
for ratification. Without it, ratification almost surely would have failed.255 The 
Anti-Federalists initially were in the majority in the key States of 
Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia, as well as in New Hampshire and 
 
 252 U.S. CONST. amend V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . .”).  
 253 See Davies, supra note 32; Davies, supra note 137. 
 254 Robin Brooks, Alexander Hamilton, Melancton Smith, and the Ratification of the Constitution in New 
York, 24 WM. & MARY Q. 339, 339 (1967). 
 255 See NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 97 (1937) (“The general view . . . is that the Constitution would never have 
been ratified . . . but for the tacit understanding that it would be amended so as to embody the customary 
guaranties of personal liberty.”). 
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North Carolina.256 Indeed, in New York, popular sentiment was opposed to 
ratification by a margin of greater than two to one.257 The Federalists realized 
that they would need to promise adoption of such a bill shortly after ratification 
in order to ensure that the Constitution would be ratified.258 In Massachusetts, 
the first state in which the Constitution met with serious opposition, it first 
“seemed doubtful that enough votes in favor could be mustered.”259 
Ratification would have been impossible there had the Federalists not 
“siphon[ed] off votes from the Antifederalist majority” by agreeing to propose 
amendments to Congress.260 Likewise, “the Federalists of Virginia realized that 
they were not a commanding majority and would have to compromise to avert 
rejection of the Constitution or irresistible demands for its radical 
modification.”261 That compromise consisted of a proposal for a bill of 
rights.262 
Although a sufficient number of States had ratified prior to ratification by 
the New York and Virginia conventions,263 a Union without these States would 
 
 256 See MAIN, supra note 197, at 288 app. D (showing that initial votes in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
New York, and North Carolina were against ratification, while Virginia’s convention was tied); Lienesch, 
supra note 189, at 348 (characterizing as an exaggeration, “though probably not by much,” a cotemporaneous 
estimate that 90% of North Carolinians opposed ratification); Cecelia M. Kenyon, Men of Little Faith: The 
Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Representative Government, 12 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 5 (1955) (“A very large 
proportion of the people in 1787–1788 were Anti-Federalists . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); Wilmarth, supra note 
184, at 1288 (observing that Federalists were in minority in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and 
Virginia). 
 257 See Forrest McDonald, The Anti-Federalists, 1781–1789, in THE REINTERPRETATION OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1763–1789, at 365, 373 (Jack P. Greene ed., 1968); see also CUDDIHY, supra note 
236, at 702 (“The New York convention commenced with a huge majority of its members opposing the 
Constitution.”). 
 258 See LASSON, supra note 255, at 94 (“[T]he friends of the Constitution saw that with the parties so 
nearly equal and with the outcome so doubtful, some concession would have to be made to save the 
Constitution from defeat . . . .”); Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Self-Government, the Federal Death 
Penalty, and the Unusual Case of Michael Jacques, 36 VT. L. REV. 131, 146 (2011) (“James Madison himself 
believed that ratification by Virginia would have been impossible without a pledge to adopt the recommended 
amendments.”). 
 259 THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE, supra note 188, at 91. 
 260 CUDDIHY, supra note 236, at 701; accord THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE, supra note 188, at 91 
(recounting that opponents of Constitution in Massachusetts, including Samuel Adams and John Hancock, 
eventually assented on the condition that amendments be recommended). 
 261 CUDDIHY, supra note 236, at 702. 
 262 Id.; accord THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE, supra note 188, at 92 (observing that when ratification 
debate moved to Virginia, the advocates of ratification adopted “[t]he Massachusetts formula” of promising 
that amendments be recommended in exchange for ratification). 
 263 See MAIN, supra note 197, at 288 app. D. 
MANNHEIMER PROOFS2 5/7/2015  10:43 AM 
1280 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1229 
have been almost inconceivable.264 Without New York, which separated New 
England from the rest of the young nation, and Virginia, which stretched from 
the Atlantic to the Mississippi, the Union would have been left in three 
noncontiguous pieces, and deprived of almost 30% of its population265 and one 
of its busiest ports. Only by pledging to advance the adoption of a bill of rights 
as one of the first orders of business of the new government did the Federalists 
secure ratification by swaying a sufficient number of moderate Anti-Federalists 
to their fold.266 
In particular, the views of the moderate Anti-Federalists, those who were at 
first opposed to the Constitution but ultimately voted for it based on the 
promise of a bill of rights, are absolutely critical. While hard-line 
Anti-Federalists who voted against the Constitution were not a party to the 
compromise, the moderates were. At the New York ratifying convention, 
following ratification by ten other States, these more moderate Anti-Federalists 
sought not outright rejection of the Constitution but “assurances that the 
defects of the proposed Constitution could be remedied.”267 Thus, we have to 
look to men like Melancton Smith, who led the Anti-Federalists at the New 
York ratifying convention as their “most eloquent and outspoken” member.268 
Smith was the leader of the moderate New York Anti-Federalists and voted in 
favor of ratification, taking eleven other moderate Anti-Federalists with him.269 
It was Smith and his followers who provided the “bare margin of victory for 
 
 264 See THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE, supra note 188, at 92 (“Even if enough states ratified to put the 
Constitution into effect, no one entertained the slightest hope for its success without New York and 
Virginia . . . .”). 
 265 See Mannheimer, supra note 258, at 146. 
 266 See CUDDIHY, supra note 236, at 706 (asserting that ratification was achieved in Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New York, and Virginia only because it was thought predicated on approval of amendments); THE 
STATES RIGHTS DEBATE, supra note 188, at 92 (recounting Madison’s acquiescence to amendments lest 
Anti-Federalists succeed in postponing ratification process); see also Mannheimer, supra note 209, at 108–09. 
 267 Richard B. Morris, John Jay and the Adoption of the Federal Constitution in New York: A New 
Reading of Persons and Events, 63 N.Y. HIST. 133, 149 (1982); see also Linda Grant De Pauw, E. Wilder 
Spaulding and New York History, 49 N.Y. HIST. 142, 152 (1968) (“[T]he Antifederalist program [in New 
York] was not to reject the Constitution, but to adopt it with previous amendments”); Narrett, supra note 245, 
at 297 (“[M]ost Antifederalists [at the New York convention] favored the reform rather than the rejection of 
the Constitution.”). 
 268 Narrett, supra note 245, at 291.  
 269 See Brooks, supra note 254, at 353, 357; Morris, supra note 267, at 162; Narrett, supra note 245, at 
288–89. For the roll call vote, see 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 200, at 413. 
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the Constitution.”270 Thus, it may well be that Smith was “indispensable to 
successful ratification” in New York.271 
Alone among the leaders of the Anti-Federalist cause, Smith possessed “a 
sufficient degree of moderation to recognize the crisis that exclusion from the 
Union might produce.”272 Aside from the “economic and political chaos” that 
would result from New York’s being left out of the Union, rejection of the 
Constitution also risked secession of the southern part of the State, including 
New York City.273 Smith and his allies thus favored union but based only on 
the prospect of amending the Constitution to better reflect the legitimate state 
sovereignty concerns of the Anti-Federalists.274 Accordingly, the convention 
reached a compromise that the Constitution would be ratified but would also 
be accompanied both by proposed amendments and by a letter sent to the other 
States calling for a second convention at which amendments could be 
considered.275 
Recall that one of these proposed amendments, suggested by Smith 
himself, would require that federal officials “be bound, by oath or affirmation, 
not to infringe the constitutions or rights of the respective states.”276 Recall 
also that it was likely Smith who, as the Federal Farmer, proposed in an essay 
that federal search-and-seizure authority be constrained by a provision that 
both foreshadowed the Fourth Amendment and contained an addendum 
inspired by Chapter 29 of Magna Carta that “the law of the land”—that is, of 
the State—be adhered to when federal officials interfere with one’s “person or 
effects.”277 Because that small band of moderate Anti-Federalists led by Smith 
formed the fulcrum upon which ratification, and a viable Union, turned, 
Smith’s views should be considered paramount when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights. His views suggest a constraint on federal search-and-seizure authority 
that looks to state law as its benchmark. 
Even after Virginia and New York became the tenth and eleventh States to 
ratify, and the First Congress was in session, “[r]atification remained 
 
 270 Brooks, supra note 254, at 339; see also Morris, supra note 267, at 162 (observing that final vote for 
ratification in New York was 30–27); Narrett, supra note 245, at 289 (same). 
 271 Brooks, supra note 254, at 357. 
 272 Id. at 350. 
 273 Narrett, supra note 245, at 289; see also Brooks, supra note 254, at 350. 
 274 See Narrett, supra note 245, at 291. 
 275 See Brooks, supra note 254, at 354–55; see also 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 200, at 413–14. 
 276 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 200, at 409–10. 
 277 Letter from the Federal Farmer, supra note 244, at 328 (emphasis added); see also supra notes 243–53 
and accompanying text. 
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incomplete, revocable, and precarious.”278 In addition to New York, three other 
States had coupled their ratification with a proposal “for a second convention 
to dilute the powers that the federal government had obtained at 
Philadelphia.”279 The New York ratifying convention’s letter in particular 
caused grave concern for the friends of the Constitution.280 Had an adequate 
bill of rights not been quickly adopted, “a second convention might 
have . . . gutted the Constitution” via much more radical changes in the 
constitutional structure.281 James Madison viewed the result of the New York 
ratifying convention—ratification coupled with proposed amendments and a 
call for a second convention—“to be a complete victory for the 
Antifederalists.”282 The Bill of Rights was necessary, in Madison’s words, “in 
order to extinguish opposition” to the new Constitution.283 
On a personal level, Madison saw that he needed to back the proposed 
amendments following ratification or risk political suicide.284 In his home State 
of Virginia, the “enemies” of the Constitution “had been winning one victory 
after another since” ratification.285 The Virginia legislature rejected Madison’s 
bid for a U.S. Senate seat and instead chose two Anti-Federalists to fill the 
positions.286 Through what we would today call “gerrymandering,” his political 
enemies almost succeeded in keeping him out of the U.S. House of 
Representatives as well.287 Indeed, he won election to the House only because 
he made a commitment to his constituents to pursue a bill of rights,288 and he 
 
 278 CUDDIHY, supra note 236, at 705. 
 279 Id. at 704. 
 280 THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE, supra note 188, at 94–95. 
 281 CUDDIHY, supra note 236, at 706; accord Ellis, supra note 226, at 298 (asserting that Madison 
“recognized that failure to amend the Constitution would fuel the movement for a second constitutional 
convention, which was in many ways a more dangerous alternative”); THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE, supra 
note 188, at 94–95 (discussing Madison’s concern that second convention would lead to crisis). 
 282 De Pauw, supra note 267, at 153. 
 283 THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE, supra note 188, at 96 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas 
Jefferson (Mar. 29, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 6–7 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 284 See CUDDIHY, supra note 236, at 770 (“Madison did not write the [Fourth] [A]mendment because its 
ideas commanded constitutional expression but because he was under the political gun of Antifederalism.”). 
 285 Id. at 704. 
 286 Id. 
 287 See id. 
 288 See id. at 706–07 (observing that Madison “readily admitted that he would not have been elected 
without a Federalist commitment to amendments, nor would Virginia have ratified the Constitution in the 
absence of that commitment”); see also STEVEN R. BOYD, THE POLITICS OF OPPOSITION: ANTIFEDERALISTS 
AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONSTITUTION 157–58 (1979) (“[D]uring the campaign for a seat in the House 
of Representatives, Madison pledged to work for prompt congressional amendment of the Constitution.”). 
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felt duty bound to follow through on this pledge.289 Moreover, at the time he 
proposed the Bill of Rights in the House, North Carolina and Rhode Island still 
had not ratified, and “[a] prominent North Carolina Federalist confided to 
Madison that his state would ‘not confederate’ without amendments.”290 
Madison conceded privately that the Bill of Rights was a “direct response[] to 
these political pressures.”291 
Significantly, in introducing and advocating for his proposed bill of rights 
in the House of Representatives, Madison used language that suggests that he 
understood the differentiated nature of the common law rights encompassed by 
the Bill. He urged adoption of the Bill on the ground that most of the 
opponents of the Constitution “disliked it because it did not contain effectual 
provisions against encroachments on particular rights, and those safeguards 
which they have been long accustomed to have interposed between them and 
the magistrate who exercises the sovereign power.”292 By “those safeguards 
which they have been long accustomed to,” Madison most likely meant the 
common law rights of Englishmen enshrined in state constitutions and bills of 
rights. Concededly, he might have had in mind a pre-Realist, undifferentiated 
view of these common law rights. But when read together with Madison’s 
full-throated defense of a differentiated common law in his celebrated 1800 
Report on the Virginia Resolutions,293 this statement suggests otherwise. 
Once the Bill of Rights had been proposed by Congress and sent to the 
States for ratification, the Anti-Federalists were, for the most part, placated. As 
Jefferson wrote to Marquis de Lafayette in 1790, “the amendments proposed 
by Congress, have brought over almost all their followers.”294 It seems almost 
inconceivable that the Anti-Federalists’ passionate advocacy that the 
 
 289 See THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE, supra note 188, at 96 (“As a member of the First Congress, Madison 
felt ‘bound in honor and duty’ to fulfill this election pledge.”); see also Ellis, supra note 226, at 298 (noting 
that Madison’s “honor was at stake, since he had personally guaranteed the Virginia ratifying convention that 
he would support the move to amend the Constitution”); Clancy, supra note 67, at 1045 (quoting a letter from 
Madison stating: “As an honest man I feel bound by this consideration.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 290 See CUDDIHY, supra note 236, at 704; see also THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE, supra note 188, at 95 
(discussing a letter from Madison to Jefferson “lamenting North Carolina’s failure to ratify the Constitution”). 
In November 1789, after Madison proposed the Bill of Rights in Congress, a second convention was called in 
North Carolina, which approved ratification, after an initial convention had voted against ratification less than 
a year earlier by a vote of 184 to 83. See Lienesch, supra note 189, at 363–64. 
 291 CUDDIHY, supra note 236, at 706.  
 292 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1025 (1971) (statement of 
Rep. Madison, June 8, 1789). 
 293 See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
 294 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Marquis de Lafayette (Apr. 2, 1790), reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra 
note 292, at 1004, 1004.  
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Constitution be amended to incorporate the common-law rights of Englishmen 
would have been satisfied had they not believed that those rights would be 
dictated by state law. 
In short, the Bill of Rights was attributable almost entirely to the 
Federalists’ efforts to placate moderate Anti-Federalists. As Murray Dry put it:  
“[W]hile the Federalists gave us the Constitution, the Anti-Federalists gave us 
the Bill of Rights.”295 For these reasons, “Anti-Federalist political thought is 
essential to understanding the meaning of the Bill of Rights.”296 Thus, when 
interpreting the Bill, we must look to what men like moderate Anti-Federalist 
leader Melancton Smith sought to accomplish with such a Bill. Incorporation 
of the Anti-Federalist worldview into our interpretive strategies suggests a new 
view of the Bill of Rights, one that looks to state law as the benchmark for 
federal rights, at least where the capacious language of the Bill cries out for a 
benchmark. 
E. Reading Contingency into the Fourth Amendment 
While the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment sets forth a few 
uniform rules for the issuance of warrants, the repository of most constitutional 
search-and-seizure rules is the Reasonableness Clause. And the standard of 
“unreasonable searches and seizures” cries out for a benchmark against which 
federal searches and seizures are to be compared. The Supreme Court has used 
as its primary benchmark the common law of 1791. Assuming that the Court is 
correct, it should not continue to ignore that the common law, as A Maryland 
Farmer put it, and as demonstrated above, existed “in various degrees and 
under different modifications” in the respective States.297 Rather, on an 
originalist account, it is more plausible to read the Constitution as providing 
that federal search-and-seizure authority, other than those rules relating to the 
content and issuance of warrants, is to be governed by state law. 
 
 295 Murray Dry, The Anti-Federalists and the Constitution, in PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
ORDER: THE RATIFICATION DEBATES 63, 80 (Robert L. Utley, Jr. ed., 1989).  
 296 Saul A. Cornell, The Changing Historical Fortunes of the Anti-Federalists, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 39, 67 
(1989); accord Palmer, supra note 184, at 105 (“The Antifederalist origin to the demand for a Bill of Rights 
dictates a state-oriented approach to the Bill of Rights.” (footnote omitted)); see also Robert G. Natelson, The 
Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 73, 84–88 (2005) (discussing the 
“Gentlemen’s Agreement” between the Federalists and moderate Anti-Federalists). 
 297 Essay by A [Maryland] Farmer No. I, supra note 221, at 13; see also supra notes 219–20 and 
accompanying text. 
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Search-and-seizure principles varied across state borders and fluctuated 
over time during the critical three decades preceding adoption of the Bill of 
Rights. The moderate Anti-Federalists, who demanded the adoption of a bill of 
rights as the price for ratification of the Constitution, recognized that those 
principles were indeterminate. By 1800, former Federalist James Madison 
himself fully embraced the view that the common law varied from State to 
State. 
The Bill of Rights was designed as a palliative for the anxieties of moderate 
Anti-Federalists so that the Federalists might win sufficient support for 
ratification of the Constitution. What the Anti-Federalists sought was the 
promise that federal officials would adhere to common-law constraints on 
search and seizure. What the Anti-Federalists received in return was the Fourth 
Amendment. Based on their preratification calls for protections vis-à-vis 
federal searches and seizure, as well as their more general objections to the 
Constitution, the Anti-Federalists likely had as their premise that the 
benchmark for determining which searches and seizures were “unreasonable” 
would be state law in each respective State. And even Federalist Roger 
Sherman, in dismissing the necessity of a federal bill of rights, reasoned that 
without such a Bill, state constitutions and bills of rights would still operate to 
constrain the federal government.298 It would be odd to now interpret the 
Anti-Federalist-driven federal Bill to have actually removed these constraints. 
To be sure, it would be difficult to conclude that this was a consensus 
position. Yet the dominant originalist methodologies recognize that not every 
question of original semantic meaning of the constitutional text was the subject 
of consensus in 1791. At the point where consensus breaks down, 
constitutional interpretation must give way to constitutional construction, “and 
the meaning of the text must be determined rather than found.”299 Under these 
circumstances, the best an originalist approach can hope to do is “to adopt a 
construction of the text that is consistent with its original meaning” even if 
“not deducible from it.”300 In order to constrain the act of construction, it is 
critical “to take into account constitutional principles that underlie the text,” 
principally “separation of powers and federalism.”301 For reasons discussed at 
length, a proper construction of the provisions of the Bill of Rights must strive 
to give heavy weight to its origins with the moderate Anti-Federalists as a 
 
 298 See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
 299 RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 120 (2004). 
 300 Id. at 121. 
 301 Id. at 125. 
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reclamation of federalism from the centralizing tendencies of the un-amended 
Constitution. The Supreme Court’s current approach to the Fourth 
Amendment, which posits a uniform and static common law of search and 
seizure as of 1791, does not do so. 
Only a contingent Fourth Amendment does. That is to say, the Fourth 
Amendment should be construed as binding federal officers and agents by the 
state search and seizure rules in each of the respective States. The Warrant 
Clause, by its terms, dictates the requisite form and contents of search and 
arrest warrants. But for all the questions covered by the Reasonableness 
Clause—when warrants are required, how they must be executed, when and 
how warrantless arrests and searches can be made, and so on—federal officers 
would be bound by state law when they search and seize.302 
The idea of a contingent Fourth Amendment is entirely consistent with an 
originalist approach to constitutional interpretation. As Justice Scalia has 
acknowledged, although the Fourth Amendment was understood in 1791 as 
incorporating “background sources of law,” changes in those predicate sources 
of law would result in concomitant changes in how the Fourth Amendment is 
to be applied.303 Thus, “changes in the law of property to which the Fourth 
Amendment referred would not alter the Amendment’s meaning.”304 If the 
Fourth Amendment meant in 1791 that each respective State’s 
search-and-seizure law was binding on federal officers, changes in that law 
would not change that meaning; it would merely change the outcome in 
particular cases. As Justice Scalia concluded: “There is nothing new or 
surprising in the proposition that our unchanging Constitution refers to other 
bodies of law that might themselves change. . . . This reference to changeable 
law presents no problem for the originalist.”305 And, although Justice Scalia 
did not make the point explicitly, what goes for changes in the underlying 
sources of law over time would also go for changes as one crosses state 
boundaries. 
As our Union was made possible only by virtue of the moderate 
Anti-Federalists’ reluctant accession to the Constitution in exchange for the 
 
 302 This would of course be inapplicable to searches and seizures undertaken outside the jurisdiction of 
any State, such as in the District of Columbia or on the high seas. In such cases, it may well be legitimate for 
the courts to derive search-and-seizure rules from those adhered to in the States generally. And, again, such a 
reimagining of the Fourth Amendment would affect only federal, not state, actors. See supra note 6. 
 303 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 143 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 304 Id. 
 305 Id. at 144. 
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promise of a bill of rights, their views should be paramount in interpreting the 
Bill. If the Court is to continue to use the common law of 1791 as the primary 
source for the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the Reasonableness Clause 
is most plausibly read as demanding that the respective state “right[s] . . . to be 
secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated” by 
the federal government.306 
IV. MODERN IMPLICATIONS OF A CONTINGENT FOURTH AMENDMENT 
A rule that strictly calibrates federal search-and-seizure authority to that 
granted by the respective States would sometimes result in a diminishment and 
sometimes an enhancement of federal search-and-seizure authority. What is 
critical is that by yoking federal authority to state norms, the contingent Fourth 
Amendment reserves to each State the responsibility for establishing the 
contours of all searches and seizures occurring within its boundaries, by both 
state and federal officials. 
For example, rather than the rule of Atwater v. City of Lago Vista307 
permitting warrantless arrests for even minor offenses,308 a contingent Fourth 
Amendment would be read to require that federal officials arrest for minor 
offenses only to the extent that their state counterparts can do the same. Of 
course, it is rare for federal officials to make arrests for minor crimes, so such 
cases would be few and far between.309 But imagine the not unlikely scenario 
of another Gail Atwater failing to secure her children in seatbelts while driving 
in one of Virginia’s many national parks.310 Such conduct would constitute a 
misdemeanor subjecting her to a maximum sentence of six months 
imprisonment, in addition to a possible fine, plus court costs.311 Consistent 
 
 306 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 307 532 U.S. 318, 347–51 (2001). 
 308 See supra Part I.B.2.a. 
 309 It is more common for arrests by state officials for minor offenses to evolve into federal prosecutions 
when evidence of a federal offense is uncovered as a result of the arrest. See Wayne A. Logan, Erie and 
Federal Criminal Courts, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1243, 1252–53 (2010). Such a scenario brings up the added 
complication of whether the exclusionary rule should operate to bar from federal court the use of evidence 
discovered by state officials as a result of a violation of state law. Accordingly, I have set such cases aside. 
 310 See Virginia, NAT’L PARK SERVICE, http://www.nps.gov/state/va/index.htm?program=all (last visited 
Apr. 27, 2015). 
 311 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1865(a) (West 2014) (“A person that violates any regulation authorized by section 
100751(a) of title 54 shall be imprisoned not more than 6 months, fined under this title, or both, and be 
adjudged to pay all cost of the proceedings.”); 54 U.S.C.A. § 100751(a) (West 2014) (“The Secretary [of the 
Interior] shall prescribe such regulations as the Secretary considers necessary or proper for the use and 
management of System units.”); id. § 100751(c) (“Criminal penalties for a violation of a regulation prescribed 
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with Atwater, federal law would permit a full custodial arrest of our 
hypothetical driver.312 But Virginia law generally forbids the full custodial 
arrest of anyone suspected of a misdemeanor and requires that a summons be 
issued instead.313 It is hardly a stretch of the English language to say that the 
fact that our hypothetical driver’s arrest would have been illegal if undertaken 
by Virginia authorities, for the same conduct, would render her arrest by the 
federal government in Virginia an “unreasonable . . . seizure[]” within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
In other cases the federal government would have greater authority than it 
has under current law. Consider the pre-Payton case of United States v. Reed, 
in which federal Drug Enforcement agents forcibly entered the defendant’s 
apartment in New York to arrest her without a warrant for a federal drug 
offense.314 Such a forcible warrantless entry to arrest would have been 
authorized by a state statute had New York authorities been performing the 
arrest.315 Correctly predicting the outcome of Payton v. New York,316 the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the warrantless entry violated 
the Fourth Amendment.317 Yet, if the Fourth Amendment is best read as a 
federalism-based constraint on federal action, then the one-size-fits-all rule 
eventually established by Payton, requiring warrants for all in-home arrests, 
state and federal, is questionable.318 And if Payton was an unwarranted 
incursion on state power, then Reed was at least as unwarranted an incursion 
on federal power. Where state law expressly permits warrantless forcible 
in-home arrests, and assuming the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid 
them, federal agents ought to be able to rely on the permissive state statute and 
conduct such arrests as well. 
 
under this section are provided by section 1865 of title 18.”); 36 C.F.R. § 4.15(a) (2015) (“Each operator and 
passenger occupying any seating position of a motor vehicle in a park area will have the safety belt or child 
restraint system properly fastened at all times when the vehicle is in motion.”). 
 312 See 54 U.S.C.A. § 102701(a)(2)(B) (permitting a park ranger to “make arrests without warrant for any 
offense against the United States committed in the presence” of the ranger). 
 313 See VA. CODE. ANN. § 18.2-11 (West 2012); id. § 19.2-74(A)(1) (West Supp. 2014); see also Virginia 
v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 167 (2008). 
 314 572 F.2d 412, 415–16 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 315 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.15(4) (McKinney 2004) (“In order to effect . . . an arrest, a police 
officer may enter premises in which he reasonably believes [a] person [subject to arrest] to be present . . . .”). 
The context makes clear that no warrant is required. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 578 & n.9 (1980). 
 316 445 U.S. at 590. For a discussion of Payton, see supra Part I.B.2.b. 
 317 See Reed, 572 F.2d at 424. 
 318 Cf. supra note 6 (reserving judgment on whether and to what extent the Fourth Amendment should be 
read to bind the States via the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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Note that even in areas where the Court has established a liberty-enhancing 
Fourth Amendment rule, it has, at the same time, allowed the uniform rule to 
“preempt the field,” subjecting all future refinements of the rule to a stultifying 
uniformity as well. Accordingly, a subsequent judicial gloss on that rule might 
result in a net diminishment of liberty across the board. A contingent Fourth 
Amendment would not only free the federal government from the confines of 
the rule in jurisdictions that do not recognize it but also more strictly 
circumscribe federal action in those jurisdictions that do recognize it. 
Consider the knock-and-announce rule. The Court held in Wilson v. 
Arkansas that all law enforcement, state and federal, must generally abide by 
the liberty-enhancing rule that officers serving a warrant must first knock and 
announce their presence before breaking doors.319 However, the Court 
ominously warned in the same opinion “that under certain circumstances the 
presumption in favor of announcement necessarily would give way to contrary 
considerations.”320 It was not long before the Court cut back on the general 
rule by announcing—across the board, for state and federal officials alike—
that as long as “police . . . have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and 
announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be 
dangerous or futile, or that it would . . . allow[] the destruction of evidence,” 
prior announcement could be dispensed with.321 In a subsequent case involving 
federal agents, the Court held that it was enough that the agents waited fifteen 
to twenty seconds for them to assume that destruction of evidence was afoot, 
justifying their breaking of doors.322 The Court reasoned that, irrespective of 
the layout of the particular premises, twenty seconds was generally long 
enough for a suspect to begin to act on an inclination to begin flushing drugs 
down the toilet.323 Thus, the Court has put its imprimatur on a twenty-second 
outer bound beyond which federal and state officers need not wait before 
breaking doors to serve a warrant in the typical drug case. 
But reasonable people can come to different conclusions as to how long 
officers must wait after knocking and announcing before the probability of 
destruction of evidence becomes too high to tolerate.324 While this judgment 
will depend in part on readily ascertainable facts, such as the physical nature of 
 
 319 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995). 
 320 Id. at 935. 
 321 Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997). 
 322 See United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 38 (2003). 
 323 See id. at 39–42. 
 324 See id. at 38 (observing that “this call is a close one”). 
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different sorts of contraband, it will also be informed by normative 
assessments of where liberty must yield to order. These normative assessments 
will differ not only from person to person but also from State to State. The idea 
that a wait time of fifteen to twenty seconds is a satisfactory accommodation of 
these interests for over 315 million people325 spread across fifty states borders 
on the absurd. Each State, of course, can impose on its own officers a more 
stringent rule than that set by the Supreme Court in Banks. But the Fourth 
Amendment should be interpreted to mean that the each State is free to set its 
own policy on this point for all searches within the State, both state and 
federal. That is the promise of a contingent Fourth Amendment. 
One might object that a contingent Fourth Amendment would cause an 
administrative headache for federal law enforcement personnel, who would 
have to become familiar with the search-and-seizure rules of every jurisdiction 
in which they operate. This is a real concern. Of course, in an era in which 
most commentators view the increasing federalization of crime as highly 
problematic,326 creating another hoop through which law enforcement officers 
must jump in order to enforce federal criminal law may not be such a bad idea. 
Indeed, it appears that that is precisely one object the Anti-Federalists had in 
mind in demanding a bill of rights.327 
In any event, the concern is somewhat overblown. For one thing, a regime 
of contingent search-and-seizure authority for federal officials would hardly be 
revolutionary. At least as a statutory matter, from the earliest days of the 
Republic, federal agents and officers were bound by state search-and-seizure 
law unless a specific federal statute provided otherwise.328 That meant that 
 
 325 The latest estimate available for the population of the United States is 316,128,839 as of July 1, 2013. 
See AM. FACTFINDER, http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/community_facts.xhtml (last visited 
Apr. 27, 2015) (under “Population” select “2013 Population Estimate (as of July 1, 2013)”). 
 326 Much ink has been spilled on this topic. See TASK FORCE ON FEDERALIZATION OF CRIM. LAW, THE 
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW (1998), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
publications/criminaljustice/Federalization_of_Criminal_Law.authcheckdam.pdf; Symposium, The Federal 
Role in Criminal Law, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 9 (1996); Symposium, Federalism and the 
Criminal Justice System, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 757 (1996); Symposium, Federalization of Crime, 46 HASTINGS 
L.J. 965 (1995); Second Annual Lawyers Convention of the Federalist Society: The Constitution and Federal 
Criminal Law, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1659 (1989). For a contrary view, see Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. 
Grobey, Debunking Claims of Over-Federalization of Criminal Law, 62 EMORY L.J. 1 (2012). 
 327 See Thomas, supra note 184, at 160 (“The principal concern in the Bill of Rights was . . . . to create 
formidable obstacles to federal investigation and prosecution of crime.”). 
 328 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (“[F]or any crime or offence against the United 
States, the offender may, by any justice or judge of the United States, or by any justice of the peace, or other 
magistrate of any of the United States where he may be found agreeably to the usual mode of process against 
offenders in such state . . . be arrested . . . .” (emphasis added)); Militia Act of 1792, ch. 28, § 9, 1 Stat. 264, 
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changes in the underlying state law over time would likely also have altered 
the authority of federal officials.329 This was so until 1935, when Congress first 
explicitly granted federal officers general arrest authority that differed from 
underlying state law.330 Thus, unless specific authority were given by a 
particular statute, federal search-and-seizure authority tracked state law, and 
thus differed by State, for the first 146 years—about the first two-thirds—of 
this Nation’s existence. And yet the sky did not fall. 
Moreover, federal search-and-seizure authority under the Fourth 
Amendment is, in reality, currently variable, and intractably so. Professor 
Wayne Logan has identified over twenty-five important search-and-seizure 
issues over which the United States Courts of Appeals disagree amongst 
themselves.331 Some of these disagreements are, as of this writing, nearly two 
decades old.332 In a very real sense, the search-and-seizure authority of federal 
officers already varies based on which part of the country they work in. And 
given that new issues and new disagreements arise all the time, and that the 
Supreme Court tends to take at most two or three Fourth Amendment cases per 
Term, that reality is not going away anytime soon. Better that we ground that 
reality, not in the arbitrarily drawn lines separating the federal circuits, but in 
the history surrounding the ratification of the Fourth Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
Originalist methodology has increasingly influenced Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence for about the last forty years and, it is fair to say, has dominated 
it for about the last twenty. But the originalism that the Supreme Court has 
advanced is faulty. It conceives of a common law of search and seizure that 
was largely uniform, static, and generic at the founding. And it imagines that 
 
265 (granting federal “marshals of the several districts and their deputies . . . the same powers in executing the 
laws of the United States, as sheriffs and their deputies in the several states have by law, in executing the laws 
of their respective states”); see also Davies, supra note 32, at 210 (“Prior to the 1930s . . . warrantless arrests 
by federal officers . . . were subject to the law of the state in which the arrest was made.”). 
 329 Davies, supra note 32, at 191 n.599 (“[C]hanges in state warrantless arrest law were probably 
understood to automatically expand the warrantless arrest authority of many federal officers . . . .”). 
 330 See Davies, supra note 5, at 611–12 (“Congress never explicitly authorized marshals to make 
warrantless arrests until 1935.”). 
 331 See Logan, supra note 170, at 1195–1200 app. A. I have included in this figure only those 
disagreements on the substance of the Fourth Amendment, and not those on the scope of the exclusionary rule 
or appellate review. 
 332 See id. (identifying five issues over which the courts have been split since at least 1996). 
MANNHEIMER PROOFS2 5/7/2015  10:43 AM 
1292 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64:1229 
the members of the founding generation conceived of the common law in that 
way as well. 
The real picture is far more complex. At least in marginal cases, the ones 
that matter most in the incremental shaping of law that is the role of judges, the 
law of search and seizure during the framing period was hardly uniform or 
static. Moreover, the insight that the common law was tied to sovereignty and 
therefore differed by jurisdiction did not suddenly burst forth on the scene in 
the twentieth century but was alive with the Anti-Federalists and Jeffersonian 
Republicans at the end of the eighteenth. A more nuanced originalist approach 
to the Fourth Amendment requires a reassessment both of the reality and 
perception of the common law of search and seizure during the framing period 
and of the place of the Bill of Rights uniquely as a constraint on federal power. 
Such a reassessment leads most plausibly to a contingent Fourth Amendment, 
by which federal authority to search and seize is generally calibrated to state 
norms. 
At the very least, an acknowledgement of the origins of the Fourth 
Amendment in the differentiated common law of search and seizure present at 
the founding and the struggle of the Anti-Federalists to cabin federal authority 
via state law should cause us to rethink Fourth Amendment doctrine. In 
positing a monolithic Fourth Amendment applicable to state and federal 
governments alike, the Court has paid inadequate attention to state law as a 
guidepost for constitutional constraints on the federal government and, at the 
same time, has disregarded the essential federalism component of the 
Amendment which makes jot-for-jot incorporation against the States highly 
problematic. For too long, our view of the Fourth Amendment, and the Bill of 
Rights more generally, has been driven by the laudable notion that we are a 
Union of states at the expense of the equally laudable notion that we are a 
union of States. 
 
